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This study investigates whether the case of AB v Minister of Social Development would be 
decided differently in 2020. The AB case was heard in 2015 and revolved around the ‘no-
double-donor’ requirement, which is a condition for a valid surrogate motherhood agreement. 
This prerequisite, contained in section 294 of the Children’s Act, excludes those who are 
‘pregnancy’ and ‘conception’ infertile from accessing surrogacy as a means to have a child – 
a limitation justified as being in the resultant child’s best interests. The empirical studies in 
2015, which investigated children up to the age of ten, cast doubt on the established belief in 
the importance of genetic relatedness for the positive well-being of children. Consequently, the 
constitutionality of the impugned provision was successfully challenged in the High Court; 
however, the applicants failed to convince the majority in the Constitutional Court, who 
rejected the empirical findings, fearing psychological harm would result in children who lacked 
certainty regarding their genetic origins. The research in 2015 could not conclusively respond 
to this concern as it was clearly deficient in examining adolescence – the key stage in a child’s 
identity formation. Since then, the best available empirical research includes the adjustment of 
adolescents – and the results now confirm that, despite lacking a biological and gestational link 
to their parents, donor-conceived surrogate children are well-adjusted and exhibit high self-
esteem. The new evidence shows the fears of the majority to be unfounded. In the absence of 
a rational link between section 294 and the child’s best interests, the Court should declare the 
impugned provision unconstitutional. This study clearly shows that the no-double-donor 
requirement of section 294 fails to fulfil a legitimate government purpose. Nevertheless, the 
remaining regulations are not adequate to provide the necessary clarity nor the safeguards to 
protect the interests of all parties should the impugned provision be struck down. New 
regulations will need to be fashioned which are better suited to the regulation of double-donor 
surrogacy, such as permitting it only in the case of full surrogacy. These decisions are 
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CHAPTER 1 –  
INTRODUCTION 
 
I PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
It is estimated that over eight million children have been born through assisted reproductive 
technologies (‘ARTs’) since the birth of the first baby via in vitro fertilization (‘IVF’) in 1978.1 
The ‘traditional’ family model typically denotes a heterosexual couple raising genetically 
related children.2 ‘New families’, on the other hand, are families formed through assisted 
reproduction, including sperm, egg or embryo donation – and surrogacy.3  
Often viewed as the most controversial of ARTs, 4  surrogacy is where a woman gestates 
a pregnancy for another person or couple.5 It has often been suggested that the creation of 
families through ARTs, where children lack a genetic or gestational link with their parents, 
may be harmful to positive family functioning.6 Hence, differing opinions regarding the ethics 
of allowing surrogacy – and under what circumstances – have long been debated by ethicists, 
psychologists and legal experts around the globe with countries, and often states within 
countries, holding opposing views.7 South Africa is a country governed by a constitution8 – 
one which upholds the Bill of Rights guaranteeing human dignity,9 equality before the law,10 
non-discrimination,11 privacy12 and the right to make decisions regarding reproduction,13 
amongst others. Any regulation of surrogacy must be made in light of these constitutional rights 
 
1 S Imrie and S Golombok ‘Impact of New Family Forms on Parenting and Child Development’ (2020) 2 Annual 
Review of Developmental Psychology annurev-devpsych-070220-122704 at 13.2. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 D Meyerson ‘Surrogacy, geneticism and equality: the case of AB v Minister of Social Development’ (2019) 9 
Constitutional Court Review 317–41.  
5 Imrie and Golombok ‘Impact of New Family Forms on Parenting and Child Development’ op cit note 1. 
6 S Golombok, E Ilioi, L Blake, G Roman and V Jadva ‘A longitudinal study of families formed through 
reproductive donation: Parent-adolescent relationships and adolescent adjustment at age 14’ (2017) 53 
Developmental Psychology 1966–77 at 1966. 
7 For a discussion on the ‘Identity Formation Argument’ in surrogacy, see Meyerson ‘Surrogacy, geneticism and 
equality’ op cit note 4 at 326-42. For a comparative study on the vastly differing views and laws governing 
commercial surrogacy, see L Maré The feasibility of compensated surrogacy in South Africa: a comparative legal 
study (unpublished LLM thesis, University of South Africa, 2016). 
8 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
9 Ibid s 9(1). 
10 Ibid s 9(3). 
11 Ibid s 28(2). 
12 Ibid s 14. 
13 Ibid s 12(2)(a). 
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– and, to add to this, the best interests of the prospective child must receive careful 
consideration.14  
Surrogacy is governed by Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. Although 
surrogacy is not specifically defined in the Children’s Act, surrogate motherhood agreements 
are. A surrogate motherhood agreement is ‘an agreement between a surrogate mother and a 
commissioning parent in which it is agreed that the surrogate mother will be artificially 
fertilized for the purpose of bearing a child for the commissioning parent’.15 While surrogacy 
is allowed in South Africa, it is strictly regulated – for instance, the Children’s Act prohibits 
commercial surrogacy, and only allows surrogacy in cases of infertility. Another restriction is 
found in section 294 of the Children’s Act, which provides: 
‘Genetic origin of the child 
No surrogate motherhood agreement is valid unless the conception of the child contemplated 
in the agreement is to be effected by the use of the gametes of both commissioning parents or, 
if that is not possible due to biological, medical or other valid reasons, the gamete of at least 
one of the commissioning parents or, where the commissioning parent is a single person, the 
gamete of that person.’ 
 
The inclusion of this provision under the heading ‘genetic origin of the child’ seems to 
suggest that, in cases of surrogacy, the legislature sought to guarantee genetic relatedness – or, 
at the very least, some certainty regarding the genetic origins of the resultant child – by insisting 
that the commissioning parents contribute gametes to the prospective child’s conception. This 
provision is in line with prevailing beliefs that genetic relatedness ensures a bond between 
parent and child, and that certainty regarding genetic origins is important to the psychological 
well-being of a child. A strong parent-child bond and ensuring the development of a healthy 
state of psychological well-being are, unquestionably, in the resultant child’s ‘best interests’.  
However, the effect of this provision on prospective parents who are both unable to 
carry a child (‘pregnancy infertile’) and unable to contribute their gametes to conception 
(‘conception infertile’), is that these particular individuals become a ‘sub-class’ of infertile 
persons excluded from using surrogacy in order to have a child. 16 Surrogacy would, for those 
 
14 Ibid s 28, ‘A child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.’ 
15 Children’s Act 38 of 2005 chap 1: ‘…and in which the surrogate mother undertakes to hand over such a child 
to the commissioning parent upon its birth, or within a reasonable time thereafter, with the intention that the child 
concerned becomes the legitimate child of the commissioning parent.’ 
16 AB and Another v Minister of Social Development [2016] ZACC 43 para 19. 
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who fall into this sub-class, not be an option. Is this differentiation between those who can and 
those who cannot contribute their own gametes reasonable and justifiable?  
This was the question before the court in the case of AB v Minister of Social 
Development.17 The case centred around the plight of the first applicant, referred to only as 
‘AB’. AB was a single woman who wished to make use of a surrogate in order to have a child.  
Being conception and pregnancy infertile, AB had no choice but to make use of both a sperm 
and egg donor (and thereby making use of ‘double-donor gametes’) in the creation of the child 
to be carried by a surrogate.18 She was successful in her constitutional challenge in the High 
Court, relying on the latest available evidence regarding donor-conceived children and their 
adjustment. At the time, research was available of children up until the age of ten.19 The then-
current research placed before the court suggested that the genetic link between parents and 
children did not seem to matter as much as once thought. In fact, children conceived by means 
of donor gametes and surrogacy agreements were generally well-adjusted and had good 
relationships with their parents.20 This research cast doubt on the once strongly held views 
regarding the desirability of genetic relatedness in families. Hence, there seemed to be no 
rational connection between section 294 and the child’s best interests. Consequently, the High 
Court declared the impugned provision invalid, finding that it violated the commissioning 
parent’s right to dignity.21 
AB sought to have this decision confirmed by the Constitutional Court. On 1 March 
2016, the Constitutional Court heard her application; however, the majority felt that the High 
Court had erred in its reasoning. Citing the risk to ‘children’s self-identity and self-respect 
(their dignity and best interests)’ as being unquestionably ‘all important,22 the Constitutional 
Court reasoned that the High Court had ‘overemphasised the interests of the commissioning 
parent(s) and overlooked the purpose of the impugned provision and the best interests of 
children’.23 Therefore, in the opinion of the majority of the Constitutional Court, section 294 
was rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose. Furthermore, the majority held 
that AB’s rights were not infringed by the impugned provision. 
 
17 AB v Minister of Social Development 2016 2 SA 27 (GP); [2016] ZACC 43 para 19. 
18 Ibid. 
19 V Jadva, L Blake, P Casey, and S Golombok ‘Surrogacy families 10 years on: relationship with the surrogate, 
decisions over disclosure and children’s understanding of their surrogacy origins’ (2012) 27 Human Reproduction 
3008–14. 
20 Ibid.  
21 AB v Minister of Social Development 2016 2 SA 27 (GP). 
22 AB supra note 16 para 294. 
23 AB supra note 16 para 293. 
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This was a disappointing end for AB. The evidence the applicants placed before the 
Court consisting of expert opinions and psychological studies was the best available evidence 
at the time. Yet, the shortcoming of the evidence was that the studies regarding child adjustment 
were still in their early stages. This was indeed pointed out in the papers filed by the Minister.24 
The researchers at the time of judgment had studied families with children up to the age of ten, 
and at that point could only predict that these well-adjusted children would most likely become 
well-adjusted teenagers.25 Adolescence, however, is a distinct time of identity formation26 and 
the available evidence could not conclusively show that once these children reached 
adolescence (armed with a greater understanding of genetics, biology and heritage) they would 
not suffer from a profound loss of self.  
Research in this area of psychology is, however, on-going and ever-changing.27 With 
continual advancements in technology and a growing body of research, the Court is far better 
placed now than it was five years ago to make a decision regarding the child’s best interests. 
Will new research undermine or strengthen the significance placed on the genetic link within 
families? 
 
II PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study is to ascertain whether – by taking into account present-day studies 
–  AB would have been decided differently in 2020. In order to determine this, I will investigate 
the most relevant, reliable and currently available research regarding the adjustment of 
adolescents who were born via surrogacy and whose parents made use of donor gametes in 
their conception. The aim of this investigation is to establish whether the research findings 
strengthen or undermine the belief that genetic relatedness is a critical consideration in 
safeguarding the surrogate child’s best interests.  Since adolescence is an important stage in a 
child’s development of identity, it is a vital piece in the evidential puzzle which was missing 
in 2015.    
 In doing so, this study further seeks to investigate the reasoning of the courts in the AB 
case, and determine whether the new research findings would provide sufficient evidence to 
call into question the underlying premise of the Constitutional Court’s majority. How much 
 
24 Minister’s answering affidavit to AB founding affidavit para 8.31 (record 1435). 
25 Jadva, Blake, Casey, and Golombok ‘Surrogacy families 10 years on’ op cit note 20. 
26 Golombok, Ilioi, Blake, Roman, and Jadva ‘A longitudinal study of families formed through reproductive 
donation’ op cit note 6. 
27 Imrie and Golombok ‘Impact of New Family Forms on Parenting and Child Development’ op cit note 1. 
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weight should be given to genetic relatedness when determining the child’s best interests in 
surrogacy agreements? In light of the recent findings of psychological studies, I will suggest 
possible changes to section 294 which may better balance the various rights and interests in 
surrogate motherhood agreements, especially in cases where individuals or couples are unable 
to provide their own gametes for conception. 
 If one is to properly protect and uphold the constitutional rights of all citizens, it is 
essential that underlying assumptions which undermine the outworking of constitutionally 
protected rights are thoroughly scrutinised against the best available evidence. The interests of 
commissioning parents and their intended children must be brought into a win-win scenario in 
our law. There should be no need to sabotage the dreams and deepest desires of individuals 
who wish to become parents, especially where the beliefs which prohibit these persons from 
utilising surrogacy are baseless and speculative at best. Appropriate changes may allow more 
conception and pregnancy infertile individuals and couples to access surrogacy as a means of 
having children, without compromising on the prospective child’s best interests. 
 
III  RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
 
A review of the latest, relevant and available literature will be conducted. Local and 
international journals, articles, legislation and case law will be consulted. The envisaged 
research will explore the psychological adjustment of adolescents born via surrogacy or 
conceived as a result of donor gametes. The main focus will be on research conducted by Prof 
Golombok and Dr Jadva of the Cambridge group, who are the respected leaders in this area of 
psychology.28 In respect of their longitudinal study, they are uniquely placed to provide 
invaluable insight into the well-being of children conceived through ARTs and how these 
families function in reality. The research will then be applied to the AB case, placing it within 
the South African context. A close analysis of the AB case and of the available research will be 




28 Imrie and Golombok ‘Impact of New Family Forms on Parenting and Child Development’ op cit note 1. 
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IV LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this section, I first summarise some of the key concerns around the constitutionality of 
section 294 before it was challenged in court. Secondly, I provide a brief overview of the 
critical responses to the AB case by academics. Thirdly, I introduce recent findings which are 
relevant to the case. 
 First, before section 294 was challenged in the AB case, academics questioned the 
constitutionality of the impugned provision on numerous grounds. For instance, Lewis 
challenged the notion that the genetic link requirement lowers the potential risk that a surrogate 
mother may later refuse to relinquish a surrogate child. Lewis argued that the restrictive effects 
of section 294 on infertile persons were unwarranted given that there was no conclusive 
evidence which showed that the surrogate mother was less likely to relinquish the child in 
instances where there was an absence of a genetic link between the commissioning parents and 
the surrogate child.29 Lewis further argued that although it may be in the child’s bests interests 
to be genetically related to his or her parents, it was not in contravention of the child’s best 
interests standards to be genetically unrelated. For example, in cases of adoption or foster 
families, the absence of a genetic link between the parent and the child did not mean that the 
child’s best interests had been disregarded.30 
 Similarly, Louw argued that despite section 294 perhaps being justifiable for a number 
of reasons, including the promotion of a bond between the child and the commissioning 
parents, section 294 could be considered unconstitutional insofar as it violates the rights of 
infertile persons to dignity and privacy.31 
  Moreover, van Niekerk opined that the genetic link on the part of the commissioning 
parents should be immaterial.32 Where there is a concern about the improper motives of 
individuals wishing to make use of surrogacy, this could be ascertained by the court, which 
was already responsible for vetting surrogacy applications.33 Van Niekerk opined that what is 
– and should be – important is the commissioning parent’s suitability to parent. This could be 
 
29 S V Lewis The constitutional and contractual implications of the application of Chapter 19 of the Children’s 
Act 38 of 2005 (unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2011) at 93. 
30 Ibid at 124. 
31 A S Louw Aquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpublished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 
2009) at 383. 
32 C Van Niekerk, ‘Section 294 of the Children’s Act: Do roots really matter?’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic 




ascertained by considering relevant evidence, including their intention to parent; ultimately, 
genetics provide no guarantee for the welfare of the child.34   
 Therefore, a challenge to section 294 was to be expected. Following the High Court’s 
decision to strike down the impugned provision in the AB case, Boniface opined that the High 
Court’s ruling illustrated that the genetic link ‘is not the alpha and omega when it comes to the 
formation of a family’35 and trusted that the Constitutional Court would confirm the High 
Court’s decision declaring section 294 invalid. This, in Boniface’s view, would affirm social 
parents as being of equal importance to biological parents, while acknowledging that families 
may be formed in a variety of ways.36 This, however, was not the case; the Constitutional 
Court’s majority later ruled in favour of the retention of section 294. 
 Thaldar, in his analysis of the Constitutional Court’s judgment, and especially 
regarding the Court’s handling of the evidence placed before it by the applicants, was deeply 
critical of the Court’s reasoning.37 Thaldar asserts that the question before the Court was not 
whether section 294 sought to serve a legitimate government purpose – it indisputably 
endeavours to achieve the legitimate government aim of safeguarding the child’s best interests 
– rather, the question was whether a rational nexus exists between section 294 and the best 
interests of the child.38 Thaldar argues that without being informed by credible data, the Court 
could not establish whether the impugned provision indeed served its intended purpose. 
Relying on the expert psychological evidence of Golombok, Jadva and Rodrigues, Thaldar 
answers the question of rationality: 
‘… [I]n the context of surrogate motherhood, does the best interests of the child require that 
such a child must be conceived from the gamete(s) of the commissioning parent(s)? The 
psychological evidence – which was indeed based on credible, empirical data – clearly 
answered this question in the negative. The psychological evidence shows that there is no 
rational nexus between s 294 and the best interests of the child.’39 
 
Meyerson, equally critical of the Court’s reasoning, opines that both the minority and 
majority were too quickly satisfied that section 294 passed the section 9(1) constitutional test 
 
34 Ibid at 421. 
35 Ibid at 206. 
36 Ibid at 206. 
37D W Thaldar ‘Post-truth jurisprudence: The case of AB v Minister of Social Development’ (2018) 34 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 231–53 at 249. 




of rationality.40 She contends that there were obvious discrepancies between section 294 
(which requires one of the commissioning parent’s gametes to be contributed to the conception) 
and IVF regulations41 (which allows for the use of double-donor gametes). Meyerson proposes 
that a possible reason for this discrepancy is that the ‘legislature might have thought that when 
children born of surrogacy are genetically related to at least one of their custodial parents, the 
bond between children and parents is stronger, and hence that these families function more 
successfully’.42 Relying on the empirical research findings made by Golombok, Meyerson 
postulates that, should this have been the intention of section 294,  the no-double-donor gamete 
requirement fails to meet the purpose of promoting a more loving and stable family, and so 
fails to satisfy the rational connection test.43 Meyerson asserts that the only goal which is 
advanced by section 294’s genetic requirement, is the aim of enforcing ‘a bionormative 
conception of the family’, which is not a legitimate purpose.44  
Thaldar contextualises these norms in the South African context, and argues that ‘blood 
ties’ and kinship in family formation is a concept rooted in traditional black South African 
cultural precepts.45 This, he suggests, may have influenced the justices to ignore, and even 
pervert, the available empirical evidence when it came to the issue of the genetic relatedness 
and the child’s best interests. Thaldar warns that, although these cultural norms may be 
entrenched in certain sectors of society, they do not necessarily uphold constitutional values.46 
While the Constitutional Court has been criticised in the academic literature for its 
approach to the matter, the research available in 2016 was perhaps not compelling enough to 
successfully challenge the cultural precepts so deeply engrained in our society.  
Since then, Golombok and her team have concluded studies examining the experiences 
of adolescents.47 Do these studies shed greater light on the adjustment of children – and is it 
persuasive enough to rewrite what we think about family? 
 
 
40 Meyerson op cit note 4. 
41 See Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons GN R175 of 2012, s 19 which states that ‘[n]o 
person may disclose the identity of any person who donated a gamete or received a gamete’ and read with s 
11(2)(a)(ii) which allows for embryos from ‘an individual male and an individual female gamete donor’ to be 
used for the purposes of IVF. 
42 Meyerson op cit note 4. 
43 Meyerson op cit note 2 at 329.  
44 Meyerson op cit note 2 at 329. 
45 D Thaldar, ‘The constitution as an instrument of prejudice: a critique of AB v Minister of Social Development’ 
(2019) 9 Constitutional Court Review 343–61. 
46 Ibid at 360. 
47 See Golombok, Ilioi, Blake, Roman, and Jadva ‘A longitudinal study of families formed through reproductive 
donation’ op cit note 6 and Golombok, Ilioi, Blake, Roman, and Jadva, ‘A longitudinal study of families formed 
through reproductive donation' op cit note 6. 
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V OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
In chapter 2, I provide a brief introduction to surrogacy. Section 294 of the Children’s Act, and 
how it relates to the child’s best interests, will be explored in detail. In chapter 3, the handling 
of the AB case by the High Court and Constitutional Court will be scrutinized. The reasoning 
of the courts relating in particular to the child’s best interests will be unpacked and weighed up 
against the available evidence at the time. Chapter 4 will closely investigate the current findings 
and, particularly, how it pertains to the child’s best interests. In chapter 5, these new findings 
will be hypothetically proffered to the Constitutional Court, and I will propose the way the AB 









The purpose of this chapter is to ground section 294 of the Children’s Act48 into the greater 
historical context of surrogacy in South Africa. This chapter begins by outlining the relevant 
terminology and then proceeds with a brief discussion of the regulations which could have been 
applied to surrogacy prior to the enactment of the Children’s Act. This is followed by an 
exploration of the reasoning of the South African Law Commission (‘SALC’) and Ad Hoc 
Committee on Surrogate Motherhood’s recommendations regarding the need to explicitly 
regulate surrogacy through targeted legislation. There will be a specific focus on their 
recommendations regarding the regulation of donor gametes being used by commissioning 
parents in surrogacy agreements.  The extent to which these recommendations were 
incorporated into section 294 of the Children’s Act will be outlined, followed by a brief 
discussion on the child’s best interests and how section 294 has been interpreted in light of ‘the 
best interests’ standard.  
 
II RELEVANT TERMINOLOGY 
 
Surrogacy can be defined as an arrangement in which a woman carries and delivers a child for 
another couple or person.49 Section 1(1) of the Children’s Act defines a surrogacy agreement 
as: 
‘an agreement between a surrogate mother and a commissioning parent in which it is agreed 
that the surrogate mother will be artificially fertilised for the purpose of bearing a child for the 
commissioning parent and in which the surrogate mother undertakes to hand over such a child 
to the commissioning parent upon its birth, or within a reasonable time thereafter, with the 
intention that the child concerned becomes the legitimate child of the commissioning parent’. 
 
The Act further defines ‘artificial fertilisation’ as ‘the introduction, by means other than 
natural means, of a male gamete into the internal reproductive organs of a female person for 
 
48 Act 38 of 2005. 
49 Ex parte WH 2011 6 SA 514 (GNP) para 1. 
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the purpose of human reproduction’ and includes in vitro fertilization (‘IVF’), a process where 
the fertilization happens outside of the body and the embryo is thereafter placed in the womb 
of the woman.50 A gamete is defined as ‘either of the two generative cells needed for human 
reproduction’ – that is, either the sperm or egg cell.51 
 The Act defines a ‘surrogate mother’ as the ‘adult woman who enters into a surrogate 
motherhood agreement with the commissioning parent’.52 The surrogate mother agrees to be 
the ‘gestational mother’, willingly carrying the child but without the intention to raise the child; 
rather the child is handed over to the commissioning parent(s) to raise.  
The ‘commissioning parent’ is defined in the Act as the person who ‘enters into a 
surrogate motherhood agreement with a surrogate mother’.53 It may be more helpful to define 
the commissioning parent as the parent who intends to raise the child.54  
 In South Africa, two types of surrogacy are recognised – namely, full and partial 
surrogacy. First, full surrogacy is where the surrogate mother is merely the gestational mother; 
her gamete is not used in the artificial fertilisation, so she is not the genetic mother.55 Partial 
surrogacy, on the other hand, is achieved by means of the artificial insemination of the 
surrogate mother with the gametes of the commissioning husband or partner or donor. In this 
case, the surrogate mother is both the genetic and gestational mother since her egg has been 
utilized in the process of creating the embryo.56  
In terms of infertility, an infertile person may be ‘conception infertile’ or ‘pregnancy 
infertile’. A person is ‘conception infertile’ when the individual is unable to contribute a 
gamete to the creation of an embryo.57 Commissioning parents may make use of donor 
gametes, such as the surrogate’s egg or a male donor’s sperm. A person who is ‘pregnancy 




50 See the Report of the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Committee on the South African Law Commission Report on 
Surrogate Motherhood (1999) at 7, para 5: ‘“In vitro fertilization - (IVF)” means the placing of the product of a 
union of a male and female gamete or gametes, which have been brought together outside the human body, in the 
womb of a female person for the purpose of human reproduction.’ 
51 Children’s Act, s 1(1). 
52 Ibid. Surrogate means ‘substitute’ or ‘stand-in’ – an apt description as the surrogate is the woman who ‘stands 
in’ for another person who is unable to successfully carry a child. 
53 Children’s Act, s 1(1). 
54 Lewis op cite note 30 at 13. In fact, commissioning parents are often referred to as the ‘intended parents’, which 
is precisely what they are – those intending to parent the child born to the surrogate. 
55 Ad Hoc Committee op cit note 61 at 8. 
56 Ibid. 




III  SURROGACY BEFORE THE CHILDREN’S ACT 
 
Before the enactment of the Children’s Act, no legislation explicitly governed surrogacy in 
South Africa.59 It was neither overtly allowed nor was it prohibited. The existing legislation – 
such as the Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983, the Child Care Act 74 of 1983, the Children's Status 
Act 82 of 1987, and the Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act 81 of 1963 – could be 
applied to surrogacy agreements, but often with bizarre or unintended effects. 
The Human Tissue Act, for instance, broadly defined ‘artificial fertilization of a 
person’,60 without stipulating into whose womb the embryo must be placed. It was, therefore, 
submitted by the SALC that the embryo could lawfully be transferred to the womb of a 
surrogate mother.61 Furthermore, the Act did not specify whose gametes were to be used, so 
the SALC deduced that either the gamete of a woman’s husband or that of a donor may be 
used.62 This legislation, therefore, could be applied to cases of surrogacy. 
The Children’s Status Act was another relevant piece of legislation, but its application 
resulted in consequences that were undesirable. Section 5(2) in particular posed a challenge. 
This section provided that the woman who gives birth to the child must be regarded as the 
child's mother and her husband as the child's father irrespective of whose gametes were used 
for the artificial insemination of the woman. The SALC and the Ad Hoc Committee submitted 
that the effect of section 5 would be ‘especially harsh’ on full surrogacy as the surrogate 
mother, who gives birth to the child, would be regarded as the child's mother, despite the 
surrogate merely acting as the ‘hostess’ mother and sharing no genetic relationship with the 
child.63 The commissioning couple, who are the child's genetic parents, would be regarded as 
the donors and as such would not have any parental power over the child – which was certainly 
not the intention of the parties to the surrogate motherhood agreement.64 
Should section 5 not be complied with, the common law would apply, and the child 
could be considered the extra-marital child of the surrogate.65 This still does not accomplish 
the intentions of the parties.  
 The need for specific legislation that would govern the very unique circumstances and 
needs of surrogate motherhood agreements particularly came to the fore in the first recognized 
 
59 Ad Hoc Committee op cit note 61 at 10. 
60 As amended by the Human Tissue Amendment Act 51 of 1989. 
61 South African Law Commission Report on Surrogate Motherhood Project 65 (1992) at 82. 
62 Ibid. 
63 SALC Report op cit note 72 at 92; Ad Hoc Committee op cit note 61 at 10. 
64 SALC Report op cit note 72 at 94; Ad Hoc Committee op cit note 61 at 10. 
65 Ad Hoc Committee op cit note 61 at 10. 
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case of surrogacy in South Africa, that of Karen Ferreira-Jorge of Tzaneen in 1987.66 Ferreira-
Jorge requested the assistance of her mother, Pat Anthony, to be a surrogate to her children. 
Anthony was implanted with the ova of her 25-year-old daughter, Ferreira-Jorge, that had been 
inseminated artificially with her son-in-law's sperm. This resulted in the successful gestation 
and birth of triplets on 1 October 1987, a few weeks before the Children’s Status Act came into 
force.67 
 The triplets’ birth resulted in much excitement – and with it legal problems, as the 
media debated whose children the triplets would be.68 If the Children’s Status Act had come 
into operation before the triplets’ birth, they would have been regarded as the legal children of 
the surrogate, their biological grandmother, and all links between them and their biological 
parents would have been severed. Their biological mother would instead be their sister. 69  
While provision was made for adoption, this was by no means ideal. Adoption is a 
gradual process that lacks certainty of the outcome being successful70 and is fraught with 
problems.71 Furthermore, since there was little clarity on the validity of surrogate motherhood 
agreements, it was uncertain whether the parties would be able to use ordinary contractual 
principles in the event of a breach of agreement by either the surrogate mother or the 
commissioning parent or parents.72 
The need for legislation which governed surrogacy and resulted in certainty for all the 
parties involved was greatly apparent. The court in Ex parte WH opined: ‘This issue was clearly 
a concern as it could impact directly on the best interests of the child as uncertainty regarding 
the parents could impact negatively on the child.’73 It was for these reasons that an investigation 
was launched into surrogacy. 
 
IV  REASONS FOR THE INCLUSION OF SECTION 294 
 
The questionnaire on surrogacy administered by the SALC produced a wide range of responses. 
Most religious groups were found to be against surrogacy in principle. Interestingly, the Family 
 
66 T Filander The enforceability of international surrogacy in South Africa: How would a South African court 
proceed in determining an international surrogacy case? (unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Western 
Cape, 2016). 
67 The Children’s Status Act 82 of 1987 came into force on 14 October 1987. 
68 Ad Hoc Committee op cit note 61 at 96. 
69 Ibid at 97. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Filander op cit note 77 at 21.  
72 Ad Hoc Committee op cit note 61 at 12. 
73 Ex parte WH supra note 60 para 57. 
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and Marriage Association of South Africa (‘FAMSA’) raised the concern that the 
psychological effects on the resulting children were uncertain and argued that ‘[i]t will only be 
possible to really evaluate results when children born to surrogate mothers reach puberty.’74 
 The use of donor gametes was seen to be particularly problematic, despite the fact that 
it was already permissible under the Human Tissue Act and was regarded as an acceptable and 
effective method in many circles. The Department of National Health and Population 
Development had no objections to a child being born to a couple where neither of the couple’s 
gametes had been used. On the other hand, the use of donor gametes was strictly condemned 
in the ethical-theological field, with the Catholic Church, for instance, rejecting artificial 
fertilization even in marriage. Although the SALC considered the theological views, it 
nevertheless submitted that, as was the case with artificial fertilization, a couple was free to 
decide whether surrogacy was in accordance with their personal beliefs before choosing to 
make use of it.  
 As a result, the SALC proposed that the use of donor gametes should be permitted, but 
with the proviso that a gamete from at least one of the commissioning parents be made use of 
in the creation of the embryo.75 Its reasons were that it was ‘convinced that in order to promote 
the bond between the child and its commissioning parents it is desirable, in the best interest of 
such a child, that the gametes of at least one of the commissioning parents should be used.’76 
It also opined that this would ‘restrict undesirable practices such as shopping around with a 
“view to creating” children with particular characteristics.’ 77 
The Ad Hoc Committee was called on to review the findings of the SALC. In its final 
recommendations, the Ad Hoc Committee endorsed the SALC’s position, and proposed that it 
would be in the best interests of all the parties concerned if the commissioning parent(s) were 
to be genetically related to the child.78 This recommendation was incorporated into section 294 
of the Children’s Act in its entirety: 
‘Genetic origin of child 
294. No surrogate motherhood agreement is valid unless the conception of the child 
contemplated in the agreement is to be effected by the use of the gametes of both 
 
74 Ad Hoc Committee op cit note 61 at 118. 
75 Ibid at 179-80. The SALC’s draft regulations were worded as follows under the heading ‘Genetic origin of 
child’: ‘5. (1) No surrogate motherhood agreement shall be valid unless the conception of the child contemplated 
in the agreement is effected by the use of the gametes of both commissioning parents or, if that is not possible, at 
least one of the commissioning parents. (2) The gametes of the surrogate mother or her husband may not be used 
to effect the conception of a child contemplated in the surrogate motherhood agreement.’ 
76 Ibid at 151. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ad Hoc Committee op cit note 61 at 17. 
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commissioning parents or, if that is not possible due to biological, medical or other valid 
reasons, the gamete of at least one of the commissioning parents or, where the commissioning 
parent is a single person, the gamete of that person.’  
 
The section clearly prohibits the use of surrogacy where there is no contribution of a gamete 
by at least one of the commissioning parents to the conception of the resultant child. The 
underlying premise of the SALC and the Ad Hoc Committee is that by prohibiting individuals 
from ‘commissioning children’ who are genetically unrelated to them, they are protecting the 
child’s best interests. However, due to the severe impact this provision has on those who are 
conception infertile, this premise begs thorough inspection before it should be accepted. While 
it is clear that the inclusion of section 294’s ‘genetic origin’ requirement sought to safeguard 
children’s constitutionally protected right to have their interests considered paramount in all 
matters affecting them, the question of whether this provision effectively advances these 
interests has to be scrutinised. 
 
V RESPONSES TO SECTION 294 IN LIGHT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
 
Section 28 of the Constitution outlines the rights pertaining to children, with section 28(2) 
providing that ‘[a] child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child.’ The ‘best interests’ standard is echoed in section 7 of the Children’s Act.  
In considering the wording of this constitutional provision, the court in S v M (Centre 
for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)79 held that the language is both ‘comprehensive and 
emphatic’, and indicates that law enforcement must always be ‘child-sensitive’ and that 
‘statutes must be interpreted and the common law developed in a manner which favours 
protecting and advancing the interests of children’.80 Thus, the courts are called on to act in a 
manner which always shows the necessary respect for children’s rights.81  
Section 28(2) mandates courts to play an active role in raising and securing children’s 
best interests.82 The best interest principle has not, however, been given an exhaustive content, 
but rather the standard is flexible to allow for an individualised approach based on the specifics 
 
79 S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC). 
80 Ibid para 15.  
81 Ibid. 




of the situation.83 This is a fundamental feature in the conservation of children’s rights, as it 
considers individual circumstances rather than allowing for arguments based on legal 
technicalities.84 This was emphasised in S v M where the court asserted:  
‘A truly principled child-centred approach requires a close and individualised examination of 
the precise real-life situation of the particular child involved. To apply a pre-determined 
formula for the sake of certainty, irrespective of the circumstances, would in fact be contrary 
to the best interests of the child concerned.’85 
  The court further clarified that the ‘best interests’ of the child is by no means an 
‘overbearing and unrealistic’ trump over all rights, and may be limited appropriately.86 The 
paramountcy principle must be applied in a meaningful way which does not needlessly 
obliterate other valuable and constitutionally protected interests.87 However, it remains a right 
which is granted a degree of privilege in the balancing of rights.88 Additionally, the need for 
the ‘best interests’ inquiry presupposes that courts have sufficient information at their disposal 
to understand the impact of their decision upon children.89  
The child’s best interests must, therefore, also be carefully applied to surrogate 
motherhood agreements. The inclusion of section 294 reflects the generally held assumption 
that the purpose of surrogacy is to enable an infertile couple to have a child which is genetically 
related to them.90 However, some commentators have questioned the necessity of this 
stipulation. 
On considering the child’s best interests as applied to surrogacy agreements, the court 
in Ex parte WH saw its role as two-fold: ‘On the one hand the court’s role is that of facilitator 
of surrogate agreements and, on the other, it plays the role of gatekeeper and protector of the 
rights of the parties and the children born as a result of the agreement.’91 So, while on the one 
hand the court has the responsibility to advance the spirit and objectives of the Children’s Act 
in a way that does not unnecessarily burden the litigants; it must, on the other hand, act as the 
upper guardian of all minor children.92 The court cautioned that in considering the best interests 
of the child, care must be taken that it does not unnecessarily invade the privacy of the 
 
83 Ex parte WH supra note 60 para 61. 
84 Sloth-Nielsen ‘Children’s rights jurisprudence in South Africa’ op cit note 93 at 516. 
85 S v M supra note 90 para 24. 
86 Ibid para 26. 
87 Ibid para 25. 
88 Sloth-Nielsen ‘Children’s rights jurisprudence in South Africa’ op cit note 93 at 517. 
89 Ibid at 516. 
90 Louw Aquisition of parental responsibilities and rights op cit note 33 at 341.  
91 AS Louw ‘Surrogacy in South Africa: Should We Reconsider the Current Approach’ (2013) 76 Tydskrif vir 
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (Journal for Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law) 564–88 at 567. 
92 Ex parte WH supra note 60 para 72. 
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commissioning parents, and so violate their rights in terms of the Bill of Rights and the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act.93 The court opined that 
‘[t]his will entail a value judgment by the court taking into consideration the circumstances of 
the particular case.’94  
Considering that ‘for most people there are no restrictions or prohibitions on their 
ability to procreate,’ the court warned against setting unreasonably high standards for 
commissioning parents.95 When deciding on the suitability of a parent, the court suggested that 
an objective test should be applied which would include ‘an enquiry into the ability of the 
parents to care for the child both emotionally and financially and to provide an environment 
for the harmonious growth and development of the child’ while always having due regard for 
constitutional principles.96 
Although in most other areas, the legislature cautiously steers clear of imposing what 
constitutes the child’s ‘best interests’ and wisely leaves it to the courts to determine on a case-
by-case basis under the guidance of broad principles, the inclusion of section 294 appears to 
buck this trend. Perhaps this reveals that the importance of genetic relatedness for a child’s 
positive development is widely accepted. However, the inclusion of this provision fortifies the 
assumptions of what constitutes ‘family’ and could be seen to establish the traditional notions 
of genetics and blood ties as the accepted norm. Are these views tenable in our constitutional 
democracy?  
Louw, on evaluating section 294, felt that despite the provision being justified for a 
number of valid reasons, it may be considered unconstitutional in so far as it infringes on the 
rights of an infertile person to make decisions concerning reproduction, as well as a person’s 
right to dignity and privacy.97  
The SALC contended that the inclusion of the ‘genetic origin’ provision would be in 
the best interests of all the parties concerned. It saw surrogate motherhood and the regulation 
thereof as having advantages and disadvantages. With proper consideration being given to the 
medical, psychological and legal issues that arise, the official stance of the medical world was 
that surrogacy should be regarded as a last resort. Furthermore, there were still serious 
questions among psychologists and social workers as to the protection and preservation of the 
best interests of the child in cases of surrogacy. The commission noted that ‘in such 
 
93 Act 4 of 2000. 
94 Ex parte WH supra note 60 para 63. 
95 Ibid para 70. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Louw Aquisition of parental responsibilities and rights op cite note 33 at 383. 
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circumstances it is very difficult to find a balance that does justice to the expectations of 
society, the interests and desires of infertile couples and the best interests of the child.’98 The 
SALC saw the regulation of surrogacy as the best way forward, and suggested the need for a 
careful approach with the best interests of the child being ‘the overriding factor’.99 
Van Niekerk opined that while the inclusion of this requirement appeared to be for a 
‘noble cause’, the reasoning was not sound.100 First, responding to the assertion that the genetic 
link limited ‘undesirable practices’ – such as the commodification of children – van Niekerk 
argued that the presence of a genetic link did not necessarily protect children from these harms 
and that there were far less restrictive means to achieve this purpose. To this end, van Niekerk 
proffered that since the courts were already responsible for vetting all surrogate motherhood 
agreements, they could presumably vet the motives of commissioning parents who possessed 
no genetic link.  
Van Niekerk ventured that reliable research suggested that there was a compelling link 
between infertility and the best interests of the resulting children. Moreover, since society 
places such significance on fertility and procreation, being infertile has a negative impact on a 
person’s self-worth. Hence, in van Niekerk’s opinion, a distinction made between infertile 
persons who can and those who cannot contribute a gamete fails to ‘promote human dignity, 
equality and freedom in an open and democratic society.’101 Instead of focusing on genetic 
relatedness, van Niekerk proffered that what should be important is the commissioning 
parent(s) suitability to parent, which can be measured by considering a number of factors, 
including their desire to parent.102 
It has, however, been argued that conception infertile individuals have other options to 
become parents available to them. The Ad Hoc Committee, concurring with the SALC’s stance, 
submitted that in instances where both the gametes used in the creation of the embryo were 
donor gametes, it would result in a situation similar to adoption, in that the child would not be 
genetically linked to the commissioning parent or parents. In its view, adoption of a child would 
satisfactorily serve the needs of the infertile person or couple concerned and so ‘obviate the 
need for surrogacy’.103 
 
98 SALC Report op cit note 72 at 146. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Van Niekerk ‘Section 294 of the Children’s Act' op cit note 34 at 409. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ad Hoc Committee op cit note 61at 15-16. 
 
19 
Lewis questions why persons who are unable to provide gametes for the purposes of 
conception must make use of adoption if they are able to find a surrogate willing to give birth 
to their child.104 Since a person has the right to make decisions regarding reproduction, and 
surrogacy is an available form of assisted reproduction to infertile persons, these individuals 
should be permitted to make use of it.  
Van Niekerk, in response to the ‘adoption’ reasoning, argues that adoption is not a 
comparable alternative to surrogacy; in fact the two are ‘vastly dissimilar’.105 First, adoption 
has limitations of its own, often excluding certain individuals from becoming parents. 
Secondly, adoption can result in different outcomes, for instance, the adoption of a new born 
is not a guarantee, unlike in surrogacy where the parents are assured a baby from birth. Thirdly, 
surrogacy arrangements commence before birth, while adoption is usually initiated after birth.  
Lewis contends that the Act unfairly discriminates against infertile persons and argues 
that, without conclusive evidence to support the claims made by the SALC and Ad Hoc 
Committee, the restrictive effect of section 294 is unjustified and disproportionate to the benefit 
it aims to achieve.106 Lewis further opines that although it may be in the child’s best interests 
to be genetically related to the commissioning parents, not being genetically linked does not 
contravene the best interests standard.107 In cases of adoption or fostering where there is no 
genetic link, the best interests of the child are not disregarded.108 Referencing S v M, Lewis 
contended that the ‘precise real-life’ situation of the child109 which the courts must consider is 
that the child was brought into the world by commissioning parents who had a real desire to 
have the child.110 
These arguments sufficiently cast doubt on the validity of the Ad Hoc Committee’s 
submissions. This in turn calls into question whether denying commissioning parents who are 
conception infertile from accessing surrogacy is indeed justifiable, especially where there is no 
equivalent alternative. The opinion that this provision is in the child’s best interests must be 
carefully scrutinised.  
The next chapter investigates the case of AB v Minister of Social Development111 and 
critiques the court’s response to the challenge of this provision.   
 
104 Lewis op cit note 30 at 92.  
105 Van Niekerk ‘Section 294 of the children’s act’ op cit note 34 at 415. 
106 Lewis op cit note 30 at 93. 
107 Ibid at 124. 
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109 S v M supra note 90 para 24: ‘A truly principled child-centred approach requires a close and individualised 
examination of the precise real-life situation of the particular child involved.’ 
110 Lewis op cit note 30 at 122. 




THE AB CASE AND THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter focused on the background of section 294 of the Children’s Act112 and 
how the genetic link requirement was incorporated into South African law. This condition was 
consistent with the firm beliefs of the SALC and the Ad Hoc Committee both of which asserted 
that a genetic link between parents and children fostered positive familial bonds – and that this 
was, undeniably, in the resultant child’s best interests.113 Nevertheless, many scholars took 
issue with this supposition, and suggested that there were question marks over the rationality 
of the provision.114 There was some doubt as to whether section 294 would withstand the 
scrutiny of a constitutional challenge.115 
The constitutional challenge arrived in 2013 in the case of AB v Minister of Social 
Development (‘AB’).116 The first applicant a single woman, AB, was both conception and 
pregnancy infertile and wished to make use of a surrogate in order to have a child; 117 she went 
head-to-head with the Minister of Social Development, who opposed her application.118 While 
AB argued that section 294 was inconsistent with the Constitution and should be declared 
invalid,119 the Minister contended that it served a legitimate government purpose – one to 
safeguard the child’s best interests.120 
Thus, it was in AB that the highly anticipated battle regarding the contentious section 
294 took centre stage. Finally the courts had a chance to weigh in on the matter of whether the 
genetic link requirement was in fact crucial in defending the child’s best interests. Would 
section 294 survive this constitutional challenge, or would it be struck down? 
In this chapter, I unpack the AB case. First, I begin with the factual background in order 
to provide the relevant context. Secondly, I present the pertinent evidence placed before the 
High Court and Constitutional Court which related specifically to ‘the child’s best interests’. I 
 
112 Act 38 of 2005. 
113 See Report by the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Committee op cit note 61. 
114 See Filander op cit note 77; Lewis op cit note 30; Louw Aquisition of parental responsibilities and rights op 
cit note 33; Louw ‘Surrogacy in South Africa’ op cit note 102; and Van Niekerk op cit note 34. 
115 Ibid. 
116 AB GP supra note17. 
117 Ibid para 18–19. 
118 Ibid para 14. 
119 Ibid para 8. 
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evaluate the extent to which the evidence convincingly answers the question of whether the 
genetic link requirement is in the best interests of the child. Thirdly, I examine the High Court 
and the Constitutional Court majority and minority judgments, and assess the reasoning of each 
court. 
 
II  THE PARTIES AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 
 
In accordance with a court order obtained to protect her identity, the first applicant in the matter 
was referred to only as ‘AB’.121 She was a 55-year-old woman122 who, over a ten-year period 
spanning 2001 to 2011, underwent eighteen IVF cycles in an attempt to achieve pregnancy.123 
Initially, AB made use of her own eggs and her husband’s sperm.124 However, since she was 
already in her early forties at the time, the quality of her eggs soon proved deficient. 
Consequently, her gynaecologist advised her that it would not be feasible to continue to harvest 
her own eggs.125 After a careful selection from a local donor database, AB began to use 
anonymous donor eggs from her third IVF cycle onwards.126  
From her fifth IVF cycle onwards, AB utilized anonymous donor sperm after her 
relationship with her husband of nearly twenty years ended in divorce. Again, this was after 
she carefully picked her preferred donor from a local database.127 Of the eighteen IVF cycles 
AB undertook, sixteen IVF cycles utilized donor gametes that had no genetic link to her, and 
fourteen made use of both male and female anonymous donor gametes.128  
 In 2009, AB sought out the assistance of Dr Cassim, a gynaecologist practicing at a 
different fertility clinic, who had come highly recommended.129 After two failed pregnancies, 
Dr Cassim advised AB that it was extremely unlikely that further IVF attempts would be 
fruitful and recommended that she consider surrogacy as an alternative means to have a 
 
121 Ibid para 12: ‘Consequent upon an anonymity order the first applicant will not be identified in any way 
whatsoever in the papers or in the judgment. The first applicant is therefore merely identified as “AB”.’; Order 
dated 28 June 2013 per Ledwaba DJP (record 60–3). 
122 AB founding affidavit para 8 (record 9). 
123 Ibid para 8. 
124 Ibid para 9. 
125 Ibid para 9.1. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid para 9.2. 
128 Ibid para 10. 
129 Ibid para 11. 
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child.130 Through an organization called Baby2Mom, AB was placed in contact with a woman 
who agreed in principle to act as a surrogate mother for her.131  
 AB subsequently sought legal advice from an attorney, and it was with ‘a mixture of 
shock, sadness and bafflement’132 that she received the news that the law on surrogacy forbids 
single infertile persons who cannot contribute their own gametes for conception, from making 
use of surrogacy.133 This did not make sense to her since she had already made use of donor 
gametes for several years in her attempts to achieve pregnancy through IVF.134 
 Thus, AB sought to challenge the constitutionality of the genetic link requirement in 
court on the basis that it infringed the rights of prospective commissioning parents.135 AB 
argued that while she accepted that most people preferred to use their own gametes in order to 
have a genetic bond with their child, she contended that there was no reason to legally enforce 
this preference on everyone.136 To this end, she maintained that 
‘…while persons outside the surrogacy context have a choice whether to use their own gametes 
or – through IVF – make use of donor gametes for any personal reason that they might consider 
convincing, in the context of surrogacy, the Genetic Link Requirement removes this choice.’137 
 
AB proffered that infertile persons who were unable to contribute their own gametes to 
conception, and who were not involved in a sexual relationship with a person who may make 
such a contribution, formed part of a specific subclass of prospective commissioning parents. 
AB asserted that these individuals were simply prohibited from using surrogacy as a means to 
have a child138 and that this was an infringement of their rights.139 The purpose of her 
constitutional challenge was to request the court to strike down the ‘Genetic Link 
Requirement’140 in her own interests,141 on behalf of all prospective commissioning parents142 
and in the public interest.143 
 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid para 12. 
132 Ibid para 14. 
133 Ibid para 13. 
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142 Ibid 38.2; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 38(c). 
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The second applicant was the Surrogacy Advisory Group (‘SAG’), a voluntary 
association of medical lawyers and individuals experienced in the field of infertility and 
surrogacy, who volunteer their time to provide free education, advice and support to women 
considering surrogacy.144 The SAG joined the proceedings on AB’s side and sought to act on 
behalf of prospective commissioning parents as a class, and the public interest.145 
The respondent who opposed the application was the Minister of Social Development, 
cited in her capacity as the Minister in charge of the administration of the Children’s Act.146  
The Centre for Child Law (‘CCL’) joined as amicus curiae. The CCL sided with the Minister.147 
 
III  EVALUATION OF THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE 
 
In this section, I evaluate some of the relevant evidence placed before the court relating to the 
child’s best interests. While it is important to understand that section 294 was challenged on 
several constitutional grounds, the crux of the case centred on ‘the best interests of the child’ 
principle as applied to surrogacy agreements.148 
The applicants, in approaching the topic of ‘the child’s best interests’, appropriately 
considered the history of section 294 in order to ascertain the relevant context and reasoning 
behind the decision of the legislature to include it.149 In essence, the SAG proffered that both 
the SALC and the Ad Hoc Committee advised against the use of double-donor gametes in the 
context of surrogacy in the belief that a genetic link between the commissioning parent and the 
child would ‘promote the bond between the child and its commissioning parents’. This in turn 
would be ‘in the best interest of such a child.’150  
It appears to this end that the SALC and Ad Hoc Committee were firmly of the opinion 
that a genetic link was integral to securing a strong bond between parents and their children. If 
this is an accurate assessment of the SALC and the Ad Hoc Committee’s reasoning – and I 
argue that, based on their respective reports,151 it clearly is – then determining whether their 
opinion is rooted in reliable evidence, and not merely social beliefs, is critical to determining 
the legitimacy of the provision. Thaldar, therefore, framed the central legal question as follows: 
 
144 Thaldar ‘Post-truth jurisprudence’ op cit note 48 at 234. 
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‘In the context of surrogate motherhood, does the best interests of the child require that the 
child must be the genetic child of the commissioning parent or parents?’152 
In answering this question, I first outline some of the key psychological arguments 
regarding identity formation and the well-being of children born via surrogacy and/or gamete 
donation that were relied upon by the applicants. Secondly, I briefly outline the counter-
argument presented by the respondents. Thirdly, I evaluate further evidence submitted by the 
applicants in response. I will assess the validity of the evidence at each stage of the discussion. 
 
(a) Expert opinions submitted by the applicants 
First, the most compelling evidence presented by the applicants came in the form of the expert 
opinion of Prof Golombok of the Centre for Family Research at the University of 
Cambridge.153 She led a group conducting pertinent research in the area of new family forms, 
which is a term used to describe families formed by means of ARTs.154 At the time, Golombok 
had over a decade of empirical studies under her research team’s belt, the reports of which were 
published in respected academic journals.155 She was, therefore, suitably qualified to give the 
court an expert opinion on the well-being of children born via surrogacy.156  
The relevant research took the form of a longitudinal study initiated in 2000 with the 
aim of ascertaining how well new family forms functioned. There was much concern around 
the adjustment of children conceived by means of ARTs, so the study included surrogacy 
children and those who had been conceived using donor gametes. At the time of AB, the 
research team had examined children from the age of one to ten. I will discuss her expert 
opinion as well as two of the group’s most relevant studies presented to the court. 
A study of seven-year olds, which explored parenting and the adjustment of the children 
in new family forms, is of particular interest.157 For the purpose of this study, 30 surrogate 
families, 31 egg donation families and 35 donor insemination families were recruited, and 
compared to 53 natural conception families. The researchers found that children conceived 
through reproductive donation158 did not differ from naturally conceived children. It was 
significant, however, that surrogacy children presented with elevated levels of child adjustment 
 
152 Thaldar ‘Post-truth jurisprudence’ op cit note 48 at 232.  
153 Golombok expert opinion (record 737–45). 
154 Imrie and Golombok ‘Impact of New Family Forms’ op cit note 1. 
155 Susan Golombok Curriculum vitae (record 746–70). 
156 Ibid; see also Thaldar ‘Post-truth jurisprudence’ op cit note 48 at 235. 
157 S Golombok, L Blake, P Casey, G Roman, and V Jadva ‘Children born through reproductive donation: a 
longitudinal study of psychological adjustment: Children born through reproductive donation’ (2013) 54 Journal 
of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 653–60.  
158 Conception achieved through the use of donated sperm, a donated egg or a donated embryo. 
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issues. Nevertheless, the authors reiterated that this was not indicative of psychological 
disorder as these children were still well within the normal range.159  
The follow-up study, focusing on 42 families formed through surrogacy, was the first 
study of its kind to present the children’s own views about their surrogate birth.160 These 
children had been followed from age one; they were ten at the time of the study.161  Regarding 
the parent-child relationships and the psychological adjustment of the child, these families were 
found to be functioning well.162 The findings further showed that by age ten, most children 
were positive about their surrogacy birth. The adjustment issues noticed when they were seven 
ceased to be evident at the age of ten. The authors cautioned, however, that at this age, the 
children’s narratives about surrogacy would likely be influenced by the way it had been 
explained to them by their parents. They submitted that it was ‘essential’ to explore how these 
children felt as they entered adolescence, when issues relating to identity become of prime 
importance.163  
While further research was evidently needed, these early findings strongly suggested 
that surrogacy children and those conceived via donated gametes were well adjusted and had 
good relationships with their parents.  In her expert opinion, Golombok summarised her 
research as follows: 
‘The absence of a genetic and/or gestational link between parents and their child does not 
appear to have a negative impact on parent—child relationships or the psychological well-being 
of mothers, fathers or children.’164 
 
Golombok further opined that based on the evidence, ‘[t]he desire for parenthood 
appear[ed] to be more important than genetic relatedness for fostering positive family 
relationships’165 and concluded that the adjustment of children conceived through donor 
conception and born via surrogacy may once have been a topic of much speculation; now, 
however, it could be understood in light of empirical evidence.166  
 
159 Golombok, Blake, Casey, Roman, and Jadva ‘Children born through reproductive donation’ op cit note 168 at 
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160 Jadva, Blake, Casey, and Golombok ‘Surrogacy families 10 years on’ op cit note 20 at 3009. 
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The applicants’ argument was further supported by Mandy Rodrigues, a Johannesburg-
based clinical psychologist specialising in the psychology of infertility.167 In her expert 
opinion, Rodrigues asserted that donor conception was a widely accepted practice in South 
Africa and that several gamete banks and agencies existed.168 Rodrigues maintained that people 
strongly preferred using their own gametes, and generally only elected to utilise donor gametes 
in cases of, for instance, infertility, genetic diseases, or for social reasons, such as being a single 
woman.169 She further contended that the decision to make use of donor gametes was taken 
seriously by prospective parents. As a result, these individuals devoted much time to the 
selection of a donor, viewing this as a matter of ‘great personal importance’.170 Rodrigues 
suggested that the careful selection process was perceived as the non-genetic parent’s 
‘constructive contribution’171 to the conception of the child.172 In her opinion, donor selection 
established the ‘psychological link’ between the prospective parents and their prospective 
children.173  
Thaldar, in his analysis of the AB case, proffered that the expert opinions of Golombok 
and Rodrigues complemented each other and addressed the concerns about the parent-child 
bond – a positive parent-child bond does not require a genetic link. 174 I agree with this 
assertion. In my opinion, the evidence presented by the applicants sufficiently called into 
question the views expressed by the SALC and the Ad Hoc Committee. If they were concerned 
that the absence of a genetic link may undermine the parent-child bond, it was clear from the 
available evidence that their reservations were unfounded. Positive familial bonds can be 
successfully forged in families both with or without genetic or gestational ties. Furthermore, 
Rodrigues’s evidence underscored the importance prospective parents place on the process of 
selecting a gamete donor. This process undeniably fostered a ‘powerful’ and positive bond 
between the non-genetic parent and prospective child.175 
In light of these two expert opinions, the argument that the lack of a genetic link was 
harmful to the formation of positive familial bonds – and was, therefore, not in the child’s best 
interests – had been convincingly challenged by the applicants. It was now up to the Minister 
and the CCL to counter this argument. 
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(a) The respondent’s arguments 
In order to counter the applicants’ argument, the respondents sought to reframe the ‘child’s 
best interests’ debate in terms of a new narrative: ‘a child’s right to know his or her genetic 
origins’.176 In support of this position, the Minister offered the expert opinion of Prof van 
Bogaert, an ethicist based at the University of Limpopo.177 The Minister, moreover, sought to 
cast doubt on the expert opinion of Golombok.178 
First, in the High Court – and in support of the reframed narrative – the Minister relied 
exclusively on the evidence of van Bogaert, who contended that it was immoral to 
‘intentionally create children who will not know both of their genetic parents’179 since, she 
opined, knowing one’s genetic origins was critical for a child’s identity formation and self-
respect.180 In line with this argument, the retention of section 294 ensured that children born 
via surrogacy would know at least one of their genetic parents,181 thereby safeguarding their 
rights and protecting their interests.182  
However, the link between not knowing one’s genetic parents and psychological harm 
surely requires credible evidence from the sphere of psychology.183 Van Bogaert’s assertions 
as an ethicist clearly dipped into the realm of psychology; yet, she was not suitably qualified 
to offer such an expert opinion.184 Conceding that the evidence submitted by van Bogaert was 
flawed, the Minister abandoned this line of reasoning in the Constitutional Court, offering no 
further evidence in support of these claims.185  
Unlike the Minister, the CCL in its submissions continued to argue that children had 
the right to know their genetic parents, contending that ‘children who are aware that they are 
donor conceived suffer psychologically when they are denied information about their origins 
and identity’.186 In support of their claim, the CCL relied on two academic sources. The first 
 
176 Thaldar ‘Post-truth jurisprudence’ op cit note 48 at 237. 
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was an article by L Frith, who concluded that ‘[a]t present, perhaps all that we can say is that 
it is not possible to reach any definite conclusions about the effects of secrecy and anonymity 
on the [psychological] welfare of donor offspring’.187 The other, an article by M Cowden, 
argued in favour of disclosing identifying information to donor-conceived children, but the 
article was premised on the assumption that the child had already been born.188 Neither of these 
articles provided conclusive, or simply relevant, backing for the assertions made by the CCL.189 
Moreover, it would be difficult to argue that these two sources were, in fact, evidence.190 
Without an expert opinion, academic articles merely fall into the realm of argument, and cannot 
be relied upon as proof of any particular position.191 Nevertheless, the crux of CCL’s argument 
could be summed up as follows: 
‘…the fact that South African laws have not yet formalized the realization of the right to know 
[the identity of] one’s genetic parents, is one of the reasons why section 294 is constitutionally 
defensible. The requirement that a child should be able to know the identity of at least one 
parent provides a measure of protection of the child’s right to know his or her identity.’192 
 
Secondly, as to the critique of Golombok’s expert opinion, the Minister contended that 
Golombok’s research group was the only group carrying out this type of research. She asserted, 
therefore, that no other studies corroborated their findings.193 In addition, the Minister argued 
that their studies comprised of surrogacy children up to the age of twelve, which meant future 
studies that included surrogacy children in their teenage years, might contradict their current 
findings.194 The SAG would need to answer these concerns convincingly in order to maintain 
the integrity of their main expert. 
 How would the applicants answer the new ‘child’s best interests’ narrative and 
successfully defend their most important expert? 
 
(b)  Further submissions by the applicants 
First, in response to the child’s ‘right to know’ his or her ‘genetic origins’, the SAG emphasized 
that there was no legal authority for the purported ‘right’ and, moreover, regarded such a ‘right’ 
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to be contrary to the donor anonymity scheme of both the Children’s Act and the National 
Health Act 61 of 2003.195 
 Secondly, in defence of the reliability of Golombok and her group’s research findings, 
Dr Jadva, an expert in new family forms at Cambridge University and a colleague of 
Golombok, was called upon by the SAG to offer her expert opinion.196 Jadva contended that 
Golombok was a pioneer and a respected leader in the area of new family forms.197 Jadva 
examined Golombok’s and her group’s psychological research findings, alongside additional 
empirical studies conducted by other research groups.198 Notably, these studies read together 
included children up to the age of eighteen.199 Jadva concluded that not knowing one's genetic 
origins did not appear likely to impact negatively on one's psychological well-being.200 To this 
end, she asserted ‘that biological relatedness between parents and children – whether genetic 
or gestational — is not essential for positive child adjustment’.201 Furthermore, Jadva remarked 
that identity formation is a gradual process that occurs throughout childhood and particularly 
in adolescence.202 A variety of factors in a child’s environment have an impact on identity 
formation – some factors complicating the process more than others. Nevertheless, these 
factors ‘do not necessarily diminish a child’s psychological well-being.’203 This, Jadva opined, 
appeared to be the case with being anonymous donor-conceived; although a child not knowing 
his or her genetic origins may complicate identity formation, it is unlikely to cause 
psychological harm to a child.204 Consequently, children’s best interests cannot be said to 
require knowledge of their genetic origins. 
 The opinion of Jadva was obtained to counter the contentions of both the Minister and 
the CCL. It presented Golombok as a credible expert in the field of psychology – principally 
respected as a pioneer in the requisite sub-field of child adjustment in new family forms – and 
confirmed that her research findings were in fact corroborated by studies conducted by other 
research groups. Secondly, it sought to undermine the defendants’ assertion that the knowledge 
of the child’s genetic origin was critical to the psychological well-being of the child. The 
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applicants appeared to have challenged the new narrative persuasively – effectively calling into 
question the rationality of section 294. Still, did the evidence go far enough to convince the 
court? 
 
IV  THE COURT’S FINDINGS 
 
(a) The High Court 
On evaluating the opposing arguments, the Pretoria High Court per Basson J determined205 that 
there was no convincing evidence before it which supported the claim that it was in a child’s 
best interests to know the identity of his or her genetic parents.206 Moreover, the High Court 
concluded that there was no evidence that the lack of a genetic link between a parent and child 
in the context of surrogacy would have a damaging effect on the child’s psychological well-
being.207 The High Court asserted that at its core, the issue was how one defined ‘a family’. To 
this end, Basson J remarked: 
‘A family cannot be defined with reference to the question whether a genetic link between the 
parent and the child exists. More importantly, our society does not regard a family consisting 
of an adopted child or adopted children as less valuable or less equal than a family where 
children are the natural or genetically linked children of the parents. A family can therefore not 
be defined by genetic lineage.’208 
 
Accordingly, the High Court held that ‘the child’s best interests’ in the context of 
surrogacy did not require a child to be conceived from the gamete(s) of the commissioning 
parent(s).209 Basson J opined that the legislature was obliged to redefine the traditional view of 
the family in light of the advances made in fertility and reproductive technology.210 Since there 
was found to be no rational nexus between section 294 and the best interests of the child,211 the 
High Court held that section 294 be stuck down.212 
Thus, the applicants had convincingly won the battle of section 294 – but the war was 
not yet over. The SAG applied to the Constitutional Court for confirmation of the High Court 
judgment, and the Minister, appealing against the judgement, now had a second bite at the 
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apple.  To this end, the Minister sought to argue that the High Court had overemphasised the 
interests of the parents and should instead have focused more on the best interests of the child. 
The CCL persisted in advancing the argument that children had the right to know their genetic 
parents. 
 
(b) The Constitutional Court  
The application was heard before eleven justices on 1 March 2016.213 The Constitutional Court 
was divided and, consequently, delivered two judgments. The minority judgment was written 
by Khampepe J (three justices concurring); this was followed by the majority judgment, written 
by Nkabinde J (six justices concurring). I begin with the minority judgment. 
The court analyzed the evidence in support of the claim that ‘psychological harm’ 
would result in children who did not know their genetic parents. The minority noted that the 
Minister had ceased to rely on van Bogaert’s opinion – which was the Minister’s only support 
for this argument. During proceedings, the counsel for the Minister admitted that van Bogaert’s 
opinion was blatantly flawed, and, that as an expert of ethics, she was not qualified to offer an 
expert opinion in psychology.214 The minority asserted that, even if it were to consider van 
Bogaert’s views from a strictly ethical standpoint, it would still be inappropriate in a 
multicultural society ‘to adopt a single moral view’.215 The minority then examined the only 
remaining sources in support of the claim of psychological harm – which were the two 
academic articles submitted by the CCL. The court concluded that neither of these articles 
provided the necessary support.216 Consequently, the minority held that neither the Minister 
nor the CCL had persuasively proved psychological harm. By all accounts, section 294 
appeared unreasonable. The minority, to this end, remarked:  
‘Section 294 privileges one factor to the exclusion of all others. For example, a child that could 
be brought into a loving and stable family environment that would enable her physical, 
intellectual, emotional, social and cultural development would be prevented from being born 
purely because she could never know the identity of her genetic parents.’217 
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The minority consequently found that section 294 unreasonably and unjustifiably 
infringed on the rights to psychological integrity and equality of prospective commissioning 
parents and held that the provision should, therefore, be stuck down.218  
The majority, however, disagreed. In her analysis of the evidence, Nkabinde J 
remarked: 
‘I will not place reliance on the divergent opinions of the experts in deciding the issues because 
this Court, as the ultimate authority on the questions regarding the validity of legislation and 
violation of rights, should arrive at its own independent evaluation.’219 
 
Relying on the judgment in MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal and Others v Pillay,220 
the majority stressed that courts did not depend on the opinion or ‘credible data’ of experts 
when determining the constitutionality of a provision.221 In accordance with this position, the 
majority rejected the High Court’s demand for ‘credible data’ that would support the necessity 
of a genetic link in the context of surrogacy.222 The majority asserted that the High Court’s 
approach erroneously elevated the importance of empirical research above the purposive 
construction of the impugned provision, in establishing a legitimate government purpose. 223 
In agreement with the Minister, the majority held that the High Court had 
overemphasized the interests of the commissioning parents and, hence, overlooked the purpose 
of section 294 and the best interests of children.224 To this end, the majority opined that section 
294 irrefutably functioned to establish a genetic link between the commissioning parent(s) and 
the resultant child – and this, unquestionably, served a legitimate government purpose225 of 
creating a bond between the resultant child and the commissioning parent(s).226  
In support of the this view, the court relied on an African adage, ‘ngwana ga se wa ga 
ka otla ke wa ga katsala’, which was loosely translated as ‘a child belongs not to the one who 
provides but to the one who gives birth to the child.’227 The court continued: ‘Hence clarity 
regarding the origin of a child is important to the self-identity and self-respect of the child.’228 
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The rational nexus was thereby established, and the court consequently found in favour of the 
Minister.229  
The majority judgment landed a crushing blow to AB’s hopes of becoming a parent. 
Moreover, not only was this a deeply disappointing end for AB, but its reverberations are 
keenly felt by all who long to become parents via surrogacy, but regrettably are incapable of 
contributing a gamete to the conception of the much hoped-for child. If it were indeed shown 
that section 294 successfully served the best interests of children, more credence could be given 
to the outcome. There are, however, serious reservations about the role section 294 plays in 
advancing a child’s best interests – and with good reason. 
When evaluating the majority judgment against the evidence that was presented, it is 
difficult to accept the court’s reasoning. First, its assertion that the court would not rely on what 
it termed the ‘divergent opinions’ of experts is baffling given that the only expert opinions 
relied upon in the Constitutional Court were the ones presented by the applicants. There was 
no divergence in their expert opinions; rather, they converged into a single narrative, that 
donor-conceived children suffer no adverse psychological effects. No opposing expert opinion 
was proffered to the Constitutional Court which challenged this evidence. 
Secondly, the majority’s rather dubious pronouncement that the court does not require 
‘credible data’ in order to evaluate the constitutionality of a provision – but rather must do its 
own ‘independent evaluation’ – is problematic. While it is readily recognised that the 
Constitutional Court is most certainly the ultimate authority on the validity of legislation and 
the violation of rights, an ‘independent evaluation does not mean wilful ignorance of the 
evidence.’230 In fact, the court in Pillay – which was ironically relied upon by the majority in 
its rejection of the evidence – made this very point: ‘[T]his Court must consider all the relevant 
evidence.’231 To this end, Thaldar argues that the purposive construction of an impugned 
provision should be informed by ‘credible real-world data’ in order to answer the constitutional 
question of rationality. The question is whether ‘the impugned provision in fact serve[s] the 
legitimate government purpose that it is supposed to serve’.232 
Thirdly, although the majority categorically rejected all the empirical evidence, it 
remarkably saw fit to rely upon an African adage to justify its position. The adage itself is 
problematic in a number of key respects. First, it is not clear how it supports the claim that a 
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child’s origin is important to the ‘self-identity and self-respect of the child’ in the context of 
surrogacy.  If ‘the child belongs […] to the one who gives birth to the child’,233 then this adage 
calls into question the legitimacy of surrogacy itself, rather than simply the genetic origins of 
the child.234  Furthermore, the adage is rooted in a particular culture – and not one ascribed to 
by all South Africans.235 Besides, one cannot assume that all persons of a particular culture or 
religion ascribe to all the tenets of that culture or religion. Moreover, it can be argued that the 
cultural values, on which this adage is premised, are discriminatory and the law ‘should not 
give effect to prejudice’.236 Thus, a traditional proverb cannot be regarded as a suitable 
justification in a court of law seeking to uphold Constitutional principles in a multicultural 
society.237 
Thaldar, in his analysis of AB, opined: 
‘It is apparent that the legal battle for the meaning of the best interests of the child in the context 
of s 294 should have been decisively won by the applicants – had the law been applied. […] 
What transpired in AB was not the rule of law but that of judges’ personal beliefs regarding the 
importance of blood-ties, with a transparent veneer of human-rights language.’238 
 
V  CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter reflected on the evidence presented in AB, and on the somewhat surprising 
outcome:  the majority finding in favour of the retention of section 294. It appears that the 
hidden assumptions of the majority – such as beliefs about blood-ties – were too deeply 
imbedded to be uprooted by the research at the time. The best available evidence seemed 
overwhelmingly to suggest that donor-conceived children suffered no psychological harm; 
however, it could not conclusively show that this remained true once children reached 
adolescence. It is apparent that in order to upend such clearly entrenched beliefs, the evidence 
needs to be undeniable. With the inclusion of adolescence in the latest research, what was 
merely assumed in 2015, can now definitively be answered in 2020. In the next chapter, I 
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investigate the premise of the majority’s position more fully and, by introducing the latest 




THE LATEST EVIDENCE EXPLORED 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
With the advent and advancement of ARTs, there has been much speculation regarding the 
adjustment of children born via surrogacy and those who are conceived using donor gametes.239 
It is a long-held assumption that genetic relatedness in the family is an important part of 
ensuring secure parent-child attachment as well as the healthy development of the child’s 
identity.240 However, compelling evidence was placed before the court in AB,241 which 
challenged this long-standing view. 
The previous chapter examined the High Court judgment and the Constitutional Court 
majority and minority judgments, and how the understanding of ‘the child’s best interests’ took 
centre stage. As has been argued by Thaldar, when one considers the evidence before the Court, 
the interpretation of the best interests of the child in cases of double-donor surrogacy should 
have been ‘clear-cut’.242 However, the majority saw fit to reject the evidence, begging the 
question: ‘What ideas regarding the best interests of the child were so deeply ingrained in the 
judicial minds of those deciding the AB case so as to mentally block out the evidence?’243 From 
the analysis conducted in the previous chapter, it is clear that the majority of the Constitutional 
Court excluded the empirical evidence, and instead chose to rely upon cultural values in order 
to determine the case.  
In this chapter, I begin by unearthing the underlying assumptions which placed 
unrivalled importance on genetic relatedness in familial bonds. Do these entrenched beliefs 
hold up to the scrutiny of the Constitution and empirical evidence? I unpack the latest evidence 
regarding the adjustment of adolescents in new family forms and assess whether it sufficiently 
calls into question the majority’s reasoning. Is the current evidence enough to tip the scales in 
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II  EXPOSING THE MAJORITY’S UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS 
 
(a)  Background 
To recapitulate the majority’s reasoning in AB,244 the Court found that the purpose of section 
294 was to protect the identity needs of children. It held that this was a legitimate government 
purpose since it functioned to protect the child’s best interests,245 as knowledge of one’s genetic 
ancestry is essential to one’s self-worth and self-respect.246 Section 294 guarantees that the 
child will be related to at least one of the commissioning parents, thus securing knowledge of 
the child’s genetic origins. The Court, consequently, ruled in favour of retaining section 294 
on the grounds that it protected the best interests of the child247 by preserving the child’s right 
to dignity, which unquestionably would be violated if the child did not know his or her genetic 
origins.248  
It is worth mentioning that the Court’s reasoning has been severely criticised on 
numerous grounds, including: the Court flouted the rules of evidence;249 it failed to uphold the 
rule of law;250 it grounded its opinion in personal beliefs and preferences;251 the Court 
overlooked constitutional issues including the right to equality as guaranteed in section 9 of 
the Constitution;252 the Court misidentified the purpose of section 294;253 and the Court was 
too hasty to attribute the dilemma faced by conception infertile parents to medical conditions 
and personal preferences (such as being single) rather than legal discrimination.254  
Consequently, there has been speculation as to what truly motivated the Court in its 
decision to retain section 294. I focus on two explanations proffered by Thaldar and Meyerson, 
respectively. Although there are conceivably other motivations, the two selected are arguably 
the most persuasive and deliver the toughest societal hurdles for the current evidence to 
overcome. To determine conclusively whether the Court would have ruled differently in 2020 
in light of new research findings, it is critical to test the currently available evidence against its 
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strongest opponents – specifically, the significance of blood-ties in traditional cultures, and the 
unyielding belief in the superiority of biologically related families. 
 
(b) The major motivations of the majority 
First, Thaldar argued that the Court applied a ‘tradition-based argument’ when deciding the AB 
case. To this end, Thaldar explained that for traditional South African culture, belonging to the 
clan is foundational to the child’s identity; it is the child’s social and spiritual roots.255 Many 
black South Africans still hold tightly to this traditional construct of kinship based on family 
blood ties; where one’s genetic ancestry is critical to one’s identity.256 In situations of 
anonymous double-donor gametes, it would be impossible to ascertain the clan of the child 
since the genetic origins would be unknown, thus denying the child a foundational element of 
his or her identity.257 If one applies this belief to determining whether surrogacy should be 
allowed in the case of anonymous double-donor gametes, it is not difficult to see how the Court 
could have found in favour of the Minister and CCL – for it follows that if anonymous donor-
conceived children are likely to feel that they lack a foundational element of their identity, then 
their dignity will certainly be violated as well. It, therefore, stands to reason that section 294 
protects the best interests of children and defends their constitutional right to dignity, since it 
functions to avoid this undesirable and harmful situation.  
Thaldar, however, rejects the ‘tradition-based argument’ on a number of grounds, the 
most compelling being that ‘the law should not give effect to prejudice’.258 He contends that 
the tradition-based argument, which views belonging to a clan as foundational to one’s 
identity,259 ‘constitutes prejudice against children based on their social origins.’260 Because 
‘social origins’ is a listed ground in section 9(3) of the Constitution,261 the state is prohibited 
from unfairly discriminating, whether directly or indirectly, against a person on this basis.262 
Social origins certainly includes clan or family membership. It follows, therefore, that since 
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the law ‘should not give effect to such prejudice’, the tradition-based argument is ‘untenable 
in our constitutional dispensation’.263 
 Meyerson, on the other hand, argues that the real purpose of section 294 was not to 
serve children’s identity needs – for other restrictions and permissions in the Children’s Act 
challenge that construction as a matter of statutory interpretation264 – rather it was enacted to 
‘impose a contested moral view about the inherent superiority of biological families’.265 In 
support of this assertion, Meyerson argued: 
‘If the legislature had really sought to protect this putative interest, it would not have allowed 
commissioning parents to contribute only one gamete to conception, while simultaneously 
preventing the child from discovering the identity of the donor of the other gamete, and even 
permitting the existence of the donor to be kept secret, thereby making it possible for children 
born of surrogacy to be deceived about their genetic origins and to construct a spurious sense 
of identity.’266 
 
Meyerson opines that section 294 works to prevent the deliberate creation of families 
deemed ‘second-class’ and morally inferior,267 by entrenching a particular family form for no 
reason other than its ‘intrinsic’ value.268 This equates to ‘siding with one faction or group in 
society’ which is a constitutionally impermissible purpose and is in breach of the right to 
equality, guaranteed in section 9(1) of the Constitution.269 Meyerson, consequently, describes 
the Court’s understanding of the constitutional right to equality as ‘unattractive’.270 
 While the Court’s reasoning has come under intense scrutiny in academic literature, the 
majority’s blatant rejection of empirical evidence and reliance on traditional viewpoints 
certainly conforms to many other legal systems, which are equally suspicious of new family 
forms. As explained by Golombok, ‘[i]t is often assumed, and in many countries written into 
law, that the “traditional” model remains the optimal environment for healthy child 
development.’271 
The underlying assumptions of what constitutes ‘the optimal environment for healthy 
child development’ clearly swayed the Court in favour of retaining section 294, despite 
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convincing evidence to the contrary. What is more, the majority’s instinct to root its judgment 
in dominant traditional views – whether based on cultural values, or the superiority of 
biological families – was possibly understandable (albeit disappointing) given the lack of 
explicit and verifiable evidence detailing the adjustment of adolescents born via double-donor 
surrogacy. Adolescence is, undeniably, the key developmental stage regarding identity 
formation.272 Conceivably, if it were conclusively shown that children born via surrogacy 
and/or conceived through donor gametes grew to be well adjusted adolescents, this would 
surely have challenged the prevailing attitudes of the majority. Recognising the majority’s 
hidden motivations assists in determining whether the latest evidence truly carries more weight 
or holds greater significance. Would the majority, presented with the evidence available in 
2020, be induced to make a different decision? 
 
III  EXPLORING THE LATEST EVIDENCE 
 
(a) An overview of the findings up to 2015 
In order to answer the question of whether children conceived through donor gametes and/or 
born via surrogacy are well adjusted, one needs to turn to the realm of psychology. Within this 
framework, children’s psychological adjustment is associated with the quality of the children’s 
relationships with their parents.273 Warmth, sensitivity and acceptance are all associated with 
positive child adjustment.274 Conversely, conflict, hostility and rejection are linked to more 
negative outcomes for children.275  
 The only longitudinal study to observe parenting and child development in families 
formed through surrogacy was conducted by the Cambridge group.276 Researchers recruited a 
representative sample of surrogacy families in the United Kingdom with a baby born between 
2000 and 2002, and followed the families over 14 years.277 In short, the study, which collected 
data from the families at six critical time points,278 was part of a larger longitudinal study of 
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reproductive donation279 that sought to investigate the adjustment of children in new family 
forms. In order to appreciate the significance of the new research results, it is useful to first 
briefly contextualise the findings in light of the study as a whole.  
The study produced some unexpected findings. First, surrogacy parents displayed lower 
levels of parenting stress and depression, as well as more positive parent-infant relationship 
quality than in the ‘traditional’ conception comparison group during the child’s infancy.280 
Furthermore, surrogacy mothers showed more positive mother-infant relationships, and 
surrogacy fathers better psychological well-being, than the ‘traditional’ comparison group.281 
Equally, sperm and egg donation families were found to exhibit more positive parent-child 
relationships and higher levels of psychological adjustment in the preschool years than in the 
‘traditional’ comparison group.282 
Regarding psychological adjustment, surrogacy children in early childhood did not 
differ from children who had been naturally conceived.283 However, during middle childhood, 
surrogacy children at age seven showed higher levels of adjustment problems than gamete 
donation families, though still within the normal range, but this difference was no longer 
present at age ten.284 In addition, it was found that sperm and egg donation families continued 
to exhibit good family functioning, and revealed no differences between gamete donation 
families and the ‘traditional’ comparison group – neither in child adjustment, nor mother-
child285 and father-child relationship quality.286 Interviews with children in middle childhood 
who had been told about their method of conception established that most children had positive 
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feelings about their donor conception.287 Notably, children born through gamete donation 
reported affectionate and close relationships with their parents.288  
 
(b)  New evidence – adolescent adjustment in new family forms 
This sets the scene for the next phase of the study – adolescence. Perhaps this research will 
finally provide the conclusive evidence necessary to satisfy the Court in AB. The researchers, 
though, were not convinced that the previous positive findings would be repeated once children 
of assisted reproduction reached adolescence. This was based on previous studies of adoption, 
where it has been found that the transition into adolescence presents particular challenges for 
adopted children – especially regarding the development of ‘a secure sense of identity’.289 It 
was, therefore, suggested that this issue may equally be evident in children of assisted 
reproduction lacking a genetic and/or gestational link to their parents.290 They hypothesised 
that ‘parenting issues would become more marked in surrogacy than in gamete donation 
families, and in egg donation than in donor insemination families.’291 Should this be the case, 
it might negatively impact the child’s identity development, psychological adjustment, as well 
as relationships with their parents.292 
At its sixth phase, the longitudinal study included 87 families with a child born through 
reproductive donation – comprising of 32 donor insemination families, 27 egg donation 
families, and 28 surrogacy families. The comparison group was made up of 54 ‘traditional’ 
families with naturally conceived children.293 The families were contacted as close as possible 
to the child’s fourteenth birthday.294  
The Cambridge group set out to answer a number of relevant questions pertaining to 
new family forms. First, regarding family functioning, the group investigated how families 
formed through egg donation, donor insemination and surrogacy fared as compared to 
‘traditional’ families. The research suggested that these families did not differ from natural 
conception families295 and, moreover, displayed positive mother-adolescent relationships and 
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well-adjusted adolescents.296 Interestingly, the mothers in surrogacy families particularly 
showed less negative parenting and reported greater acceptance of their adolescent children 
and fewer problems in family relationships as a whole.297 The researchers suggested that a 
possible reason for this finding was that these mothers were highly motivated to have children: 
‘As surrogacy is not something that most prospective parents would contemplate even when 
faced with infertility, it is perhaps not surprising that their strong desire for a child translates 
into more positive parenting.’298 
It appeared, however, that less positive relationships existed between mothers and 
adolescents in egg donation families as compared to those of donor insemination families – 
this both in terms of mothers’ acceptance of their adolescents and the functioning of the family 
as a whole.299 Nevertheless, it is important to note that the scores for both mothers and children 
in egg donation families were still indicative of high levels of maternal acceptance and family 
functioning;300 egg donation families simply showed less positive scores.301  
Furthermore, there were no differences observed between the various family types 
regarding the prevalence of emotional or behaviour problems in adolescents, nor were there 
differences in adolescent well-being or self-esteem.302 In fact, the adolescents all obtained 
scores that reflected high levels of psychological adjustment. To add greater weight to these 
findings, the ratings of the interview transcripts were verified by a child psychiatrist who was 
unaware of the family type; her scores corroborated these findings.303  
Overall, the study confirmed that children born through egg donation, donor 
insemination and surrogacy did not exhibit any raised levels of mother-adolescent relationship 
difficulties or adolescent adjustment problems as compared to natural conception families.304 
Moreover, while the absence of a genetic link between mothers and their children was shown 
to be less positive, it was not found to have an adverse effect on the quality of the mother-child 
relationships.305 
Secondly, the study sought to ascertain whether children felt distressed about the 
circumstances of their conception or birth when they reached adolescence, as well as what they 
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thought and felt about the surrogate or donor involved.306 Notably, the study was the first to 
have asked adolescents conceived through different types of reproductive donation directly for 
their views.307 The researchers established that the majority of the adolescents were indifferent 
about their conception, and the remainder were either interested in their donor or surrogate, or 
enjoyed positive relations with their surrogate.308 Most importantly, not one of the adolescents 
was distressed about his or her conception or birth.309 In fact, while some felt ambivalent, others 
were particularly positive about their conception. The researchers commented that most of the 
adolescents had been told about their conception before the age of seven and that this may have 
played a role in their positive outlook.310 The researchers therefore concluded: 
‘Although there has been much concern about how children conceived using reproductive 
donation would feel about their origins as they grow older, the adolescents in this study mainly 
reported being unconcerned about their conception. The fact that none of the adolescents 
conceived through any of the types of reproductive donation were found to feel distressed about 
their conception is of considerable importance given such longstanding concerns.’311 
 
Consequently, the group sought to answer whether the age at which a child was told 
the nature of his or her conception had a bearing on the child’s well-being. The findings, 
however, showed that there was no difference in psychological well-being or the quality of 
family relationships between those who were unaware of their biological origins, were 
naturally conceived, or were told of the circumstances of their birth at any age.312 Still, higher 
levels of psychological well-being were found in adolescents who had been told at a younger 
age – specifically where parents started the process before the age of seven.313 However, 
regardless of the age of disclosure, low levels of emotional and behaviour problems existed,314 
though earlier disclosure was associated with adolescents having a more positive perception of 
family relationships. This, in turn, was associated with higher levels of adolescent well-
being.315 
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Golombok, therefore, concluded that while it has often been assumed that the 
‘traditional’ model is the best environment for healthy child development, ‘the developmental 
science literature on parenting and child development in new family forms has consistently and 
robustly challenged these assumptions.’316 
 
(c) How does the new evidence hold up? 
This empirical evidence is consistent with the earlier research findings presented to the court 
in 2015 – and, remarkably, are in keeping with four decades of research on new family forms. 
The research read together confirms that ‘children in new families are well adjusted and 
experience positive parenting and warm, supportive parent-child relationships’.317  
Golombok opined that this finding was not surprising when one considers what the 
parents had to overcome on their rocky road to parenthood – infertility, legal and/or financial 
difficulties, and perhaps even censure.318 It is clear, therefore, that these children were by 
necessity planned and extremely wanted, and often the long-awaited and much hoped-for 
child.319 Notably, even in instances where researchers specifically investigated predictors of 
child adjustment in new family forms, the findings showed that the same factors were important 
in both new and ‘traditional’ families – parenting stress, financial difficulties, supportive co-
parenting, and the quality of family interactions.320 The literature confirms that family 
processes, such as the quality of family relationships and the family’s social environment, 
mattered considerably more for children’s healthy psychological development, than the 
biological relatedness between parents and children.321  
 This certainly makes for a compelling read – and perhaps puts forward a case that would 
have been too powerful for the Court in AB to ignore, had it had access to it. There are, however, 
undeniable limitations to this research which must be addressed, especially regarding its 
dependability and application within the South African context. I focus on three major 
objections to the research findings.  
First, while the researchers investigated families who lacked gestational and/or genetic 
links between parents and their children, there was no specific study of surrogate children 
conceived via double-donor gametes. While it is notable that families who clearly lacked both 
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a gestational and genetic link (such as traditional surrogacy families322) were shown to be well-
functioning, the research falls short to explicitly examine the situation prevented by section 
294 of the Children’s Act.  
Secondly, empirical studies on new family forms are chiefly conducted with samples 
in Western and Northern Europe, North America and Australasia, and so the extent to which 
the research can be generalised to new family forms in other geographical regions, such as 
South Africa, is possibly limited.323 It has been established that parent and child-reported 
experiences of stigma brought upon by family type is associated with poorer child adjustment, 
albeit in same-sex parent families.324 Consequently, this raises the concern that children 
conceived through anonymous double-donor surrogacy may equally experience the negative 
effects of stigma associated with not knowing their genetic ancestry, especially within cultural 
groups in South Africa that highly prize blood ties. How applicable is the study in such a 
context? 
Thirdly, there is a possible objection over sampling, from the sample size (arguably 
small) to sampling bias, in that families who are functioning better (or who perceive less stigma 
around their family type) are possibly more likely to participate in the research study.325 In 
addition, there is a clear lack of sociodemographic diversity in the samples, as they are chiefly 
composed of white, financially stable, highly educated participants.326 




This chapter exposed the veiled presumptions of the Constitutional majority in AB, which 
seemingly motivated the Court to come to, arguably, a rather surprising conclusion. In order to 
defeat two formidable foes – namely, the ‘tradition-base argument’ which prizes ‘blood ties’, 
and the belief in the primacy of biologically related families – the evidence must be irrefutable. 
The most recent and best available empirical research, conducted by the Cambridge group, 
crucially investigated the adjustment of adolescents in new family forms. In line with the 
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group’s previous findings, the results compellingly showed that, despite the absence of a 
biological and gestational link to their parents, donor-conceived surrogate children were well-
adjusted and had high self-esteem – remarkably, even as they entered the turbulent teenage 
years. While the addition of this critical stage provides the necessary ammunition to 
successfully confront the attitudes of the majority, whether the findings are robust enough to 
overthrow these strongly held views remains to be seen. In the next chapter, I hypothetically 
travel back to AB’s courtroom in 2015, armed with this ‘future’ research, in order to assess 










In 2015, the Court in AB was tasked with assessing the constitutionality of section 294 of the 
Children’s Act, which prohibits a surrogate motherhood agreement from being concluded 
where the gametes of both commissioning parents are not used or, in the case of a single 
commissioning parent, where the gamete of that parent is not used. The SAG sought to have 
section 294 struck down, thereby allowing surrogacy agreements to be concluded in situations 
of double-donor gametes, where the resultant child would not be biologically related to either 
commissioning parent. This would demand a monumental shift in how many people view the 
purpose of surrogacy agreements and ‘family’.  
The traditional notions of blood ties and the importance of genetic relatedness proved 
to be a formidable fortress in 2015. The available evidence used to dismantle the presumptions 
about the importance of genetic ties made for a credible attack on the imposing walls; 
nevertheless, it was not robust enough to dismantle such long-established cultural precepts. 
The result: after the SAG delivered an arsenal of evidence in support of its position, the firm 
foundations of the traditional notions of family were still boldly intact  –  confidently standing 
as citadels over what was presumed to be in the ‘child’s best interests’.  
Having completed an exploration of the newly available evidence in the previous 
chapter, I revisit AB freshly armed and ready to supply the Court with these ‘future’ findings. 
In this chapter, I assess the probability that the Court will accept the evidence and, if accepted, 
the likelihood that the Court will reach a different outcome. I conclude with the implications. 
 
II  THE MAJORITY REVISITED 
 
(a)      The credibility of the new evidence 
A significant objection which could be levelled against the evidence of 2015 is that the 
longitudinal study conducted by the Cambridge group – and on which so much of the 
applicant’s argument relied – did not include adolescence.327 The importance placed on this 
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key stage in assessing the psychological adjustment of children is longstanding – with similar 
concerns expressed in the Ad Hoc Committee’s report.328 By the same token, the Cambridge 
group cautioned that, notwithstanding the positive outcomes observed in the adjustment of its 
ten-year-old participants, it was nevertheless ‘essential’ to investigate how surrogate and 
donor-conceived children felt as they entered adolescence, when issues relating to identity 
became of prime importance.329 Thus, adolescence – accepted as the critical stage in a child’s 
identity formation – was noticeably absent in the arsenal of evidence presented to the Court. 
Fears that the earlier research could be contradicted by future findings330 conceivably made it 
easier for the majority to reject the empirical evidence outright – and instead fall back on 
established and trusted cultural values. Hence, the addition of new research findings concerning 
the adjustment of donor-conceived and surrogate adolescents gives far greater clout to an 
already impressive body of evidence –  adequately allaying fears, and persuasively showing 
that donor-conceived children do not suffer psychological harm. 
With this objection finally addressed, three more require response: first, the 
applicability of the research to anonymous double-donor surrogate children; secondly, its 
relevance in the South African context; and, thirdly, whether or not the samples should be relied 
upon. In order to assess the validity of these objections, I first briefly outline the appropriate 
arguments and evidence as presented by each side.  
In short, the SAG argued that section 294 was unconstitutional on the grounds that no 
rational nexus existed between the impugned provision and the child’s best interests. In 
opposition, the Minister and CCL argued that section 294 was indeed in the child’s best 
interests, as a child knowing his or her genetic origins was vital to a child developing a positive 
sense of identity. 
The SAG relied upon the expert opinions of Golombok, Rodrigues, and later Jadva in 
support of its claim – whereas, the Minister and CCL failed to supply any convincing evidence 
in defence of their position, nor could they provide any credible evidence to counter the 
applicant’s position. The SAG submitted the expert opinion of Golombok, whose research 
persuasively showed that a genetic bond between parents and children was not necessary for 
well-adjusted children – impressively, this was corroborated by the expert opinion of 
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Rodrigues, a South African psychologist specialising in infertility; Jadva, a specialist 
psychologist in new family forms; as well as other empirical studies. In sharp contrast, the only 
expert opinion offered by the Minister was that of an ethicist, Van Bogaert, whose evidence 
proved to be utterly unreliable and was subsequently abandoned by the Minister. The CCL 
relied on two academic articles, neither of which proved their position.331  
Consequently, it appears that while there was no reliable evidence indicating that 
donor-conceived children suffered psychological harm – there was certainly convincing 
evidence which showed that these children were in fact well-adjusted and enjoyed good family 
relationships.  
Turning now to the objections, despite existing concerns regarding sampling bias and 
even the small sample sizes, it is important to recognised that the research findings proffered 
by Golombok was unquestionably the best available evidence – for not only was it 
corroborated by other experts and studies, but it remained wholly uncontroverted by the 
respondents.  
As to questions around its application in the South African context, Rodrigues notably 
observed that in her experience South African donor-conceived children did not demonstrate a 
higher incidence of psychological problems than children in the general population – which 
perfectly aligned with Golombok’s findings.332 Rodrigues’s expert opinion illustrated that the 
research indeed remained both relevant and applicable in South Africa. How this answers the 
question of its relevance within all cultures within South Africa will be explored later in this 
chapter.   
The final objection is that the studies do not specifically deal with situations of 
anonymous double-donor conceived surrogate children. While it is feasible that the research 
results may have differed had double-donor surrogacy families been included – the literature 
repeatedly confirmed that family processes, such as the quality of family relationships and the 
family’s social environment, were far more important to children’s healthy psychological 
development, than biological or gestational links between parents and children.333 This was 
most clearly demonstrated in that no differences were observed between the various family 
types – whether egg donation, sperm donation, surrogacy or naturally conceived – regarding 
the prevalence of emotional or behaviour problems in adolescents, nor were there differences 
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in the adolescents’ well-being or self-esteem.334 Hence, the evidence persuasively points to 
anonymous double-donor conceived surrogate children being equally well-adjusted and no 
different to their naturally conceived peers. 
The findings presented to the Court by the SAG, even in 2015, were arguably so 
compelling that the majority clearly erred in disregarding it. However, the Achilles’ heel of the 
argument proved to be easily exploited by the respondents. With traditional notions about 
‘blood ties’ deeply entrenched in South African society, it was not difficult to generate mistrust 
of any evidence that contradicts these firmly established beliefs. It appears that in order to 
defeat formidable cultural and societal beliefs, the evidence must be ironclad. 
Notably, the empirical evidence proffered by Golombok has convincingly stood up to 
all the major objections. Moreover, the new findings effortlessly mend the chink in the 
evidential armour by contributing the necessary research regarding the psychological 
adjustment of donor-conceived adolescents. With its position clearly strengthened, the 
evidence is ready to battle its strongest adversaries – the traditional and societal viewpoints 
which, if left unchecked, threaten to hold our constitutional values captive. 
The majority cannot so easily ignore the newest research. Had the Court been presented 
with the latest findings, I suggest it would have had no choice but to consider the 
constitutionality of section 294 in light of the empirical evidence. Whether the majority would 
be induced to make a different decision is the topic of the next section. 
 
(b) The majority’s decision in light of the new, credible evidence 
Taking into consideration the fresh findings, it is clear that only the most tenuous nexus exists 
between the no-double-donor requirement of section 294 and the best interests of the child. In 
this section, I consider the majority judgment in light of the latest evidence in order to assess 
whether the ancient cultural cords relied upon by the majority can finally be severed. 
First, the majority correctly asserted that ‘the conditions in section 294 are the means 
to establishing a genetic link between the commissioning parents and the child to be born’.335 
However, in light of the new evidence, one might reasonably reject the Court’s next assertion, 
‘that establishing a genetic link is a legitimate government purpose.’336 The nexus between 
section 294 and the legitimate government purpose of safeguarding the child’s best interests 
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was premised on the notion that ‘clarity regarding the origin of a child is important to the self-
identity and self-respect of the child.’337 This claim was supported by an African adage, perhaps 
a fall-back to traditional concepts of the importance of blood-ties in families;338 however, the 
latest empirical findings from studies of donor-conceived children convincingly supports an 
opposing view – one where children are well-adjusted and experience high self-esteem despite 
lacking a gestational or genetic link to their parents. Our Constitution’s preamble provides: 
‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.’ According to the 
Constitution, therefore, it would appear that these conflicting views are equally valid in the 
South African context; however, they appear impossible to reconcile. 
The traditional construct of kinship, which Thaldar argues was presupposed by the 
majority, is still strongly adhered to by many black South Africans;339 it is conceivable that 
children who are brought up in these traditional communities may perceive that they lack a 
foundational element of their identity, since notions about blood ties will likely be 
internalised.340 This may result in the child suffering harm – both psychologically and 
spiritually. At the same time, however, there are South Africans who subscribe to a far broader 
understanding of family in which biological relatedness is not essential; studies suggest that 
these children often grow up indifferent to their donor conception and even display a positive 
self-concept. How do law-makers and the Court exercise their powers to ‘unite’ people in their 
diversity, as the Constitution intends, when there are such strongly held and irreconcilable 
views on what individuals value?  
To begin to answer this question, I turn to the argument proffered by Meyerson, who 
relied on the work of John Rawls. It may be helpful to put Meyerson’s argument into 
perspective. First, Meyerson asserted that section 294 works to advance a ‘particular 
bionormative conception of the ideal family’341 that favours biological relatedness; hence, 
families lacking genetic ties are seen as ‘second-class’ and, thus, should not be ‘deliberately 
created’.342 Meyerson maintained that the purpose of preventing the creation of ‘inferior’ 
families is achieved by section 294 – but that this cannot be seen to be a legitimate government 
purpose.343 In support, Meyerson proffered an argument based on Rawls’s theoretical 
framework. According to this framework, it is recognised that reasonable people profoundly 
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differ on moral, religious, metaphysical and philosophical matters regarding what they deem 
is valuable in life and what gives life significance;344 consequently, democratic societies are 
inevitably characterised by ‘reasonable pluralism’.345 These differing and conflicting beliefs 
form, what Rawls terms ‘comprehensive doctrines’, which cannot be relied upon as the basis 
of legitimate law-making – since reasonable citizens who reject the comprehensive doctrine, 
may view laws as forcibly imposing a particular religion on them.346 Instead, Rawls advocates 
that for power to be exercised legitimately, it must be based on ‘public reasons’ concerning 
political values that all citizens might reasonably endorse – because it is not particular to any 
specific ‘comprehensive’ view.347  
Rawls’s theory is useful in assessing the legitimacy of the limitation imposed by section 
294 which ‘[a]t its core is the power of the state to regulate the assistive reproduction 
opportunities available to those who are conception and pregnancy infertile.’348 This poignant 
topic concerns what many hold dear – children, family, legacy, and for many South Africans, 
spirituality. This was recognised by the majority in AB, who acknowledged that it ‘touches on 
sensitive issues that cut across cultures and for both genders: issues of infertility and the 
inability to conceive a child or to produce a gamete in order to meet the legal requirement to 
enter into a surrogate motherhood agreement.’349 Nevertheless, the majority determined that 
the genetic link was critical to the self-identity and self-respect of the child, and found in favour 
of the retention of section 294 – as it was in the child’s best interests.  Meyerson maintained 
that the Court’s reasoning was in fact based on a bionormative conception of family, which 
was ‘an expression of a contested ethical and religious view’ that stigmatises non-genetic 
families for reasons that others might reasonably reject – and consequently falls foul of Rawls’s 
‘public reason’ test.350  
Thaldar offers an argument in a similar vein. Instead of more general notions pertaining 
to the superiority of biological families, Thaldar grounded his critique of AB specifically in 
African cultural beliefs (the ‘tradition-based argument’), which he saw as underlying the 
majority’s judgment. Based on the constitutional value that South Africa be ‘united in […] 
diversity’, Thaldar argued in favour of the ‘right to be different’, which assumes that ‘persons 
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should not be forced to subordinate themselves to the cultural and religious norms of others’.351 
To this end, he opined that ‘[t]he tradition-based argument effectively seeks to enforce one set 
of cultural norms (in this case traditional black South African cultural norms) on all people of 
our country’352 which results in the abrogation of ‘the right to be different.’353  
Both these arguments are compelling and certainly show that the majority most likely 
should have made a different decision; however, this does not answer the question of whether 
they most probably would have – which is, of course, the purpose of hypothetically ‘revisiting’ 
the AB case. In this regard, although it has been persuasively argued that the law-makers and 
the majority most likely based their reasoning on a ‘comprehensive doctrine’; I suggest that 
the majority’s rejection of the empirical evidence gave them the necessary leeway to argue on 
the basis of ‘political values’. After all, while the majority mentioned the African adage, the 
reason relied upon for the limitation in section 294 was clearly ‘the child’s best interests’. The 
majority plainly stated that ‘children’s self-identity and self-respect (their dignity and best 
interests) is, unquestionably, all important.’354 
Founding the reason upon ‘the best interests of the child’ was essential for legitimising 
the majority’s position, as this purported reason is a ‘political value’ which provides a ‘public 
reason’ that all reasonable citizens may endorse; moreover, it is a constitutional right that 
undoubtedly must be preserved. Both section 28(2) of the Constitution and section 2 of the 
Children’s Act provide that the best interests of a child are of paramount importance in every 
matter concerning the child. Accordingly, the State is called upon to ‘respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil’ the rights of children.355 For this purpose, the Children’s Act was promulgated – ‘to 
promote the protection, development and well-being of children.’356 Consequently, the 
majority could be seen to be exercising its power legitimately in safeguarding children’s rights. 
How does the new evidence challenge this? Whereas the Court could be seen to be 
grounding their opinions in publicly accepted values – specifically ‘the child’s best interests’ 
– the latest findings make it impossible for the court to do so credibly. Although it is still 
recognised that in certain communities one’s identity and spirituality is inextricably linked to 
one’s genetic ancestry; the new evidence persuasively demonstrates that children in many 
families (where genetic relatedness is not seen to be important) grow up unconcerned about 
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their donor-conception and are well adjusted. This undermines the initial assumptions made by 
the majority. With the inclusion of this significant evidence, it is unreasonable merely to 
presume that the limitations imposed by section 294 are in the best interests of the child, since 
it is clear that this may only be true for very specific contexts or traditional communities. 
Consequently, any argument in support of the retention of section 294 on the basis of 
psychological well-being, and which does not offer opposing and reliable scientific research, 
will explicitly have to rely on some or other cultural belief regarding ‘blood ties’ or a similar 
traditional notion. Unmistakeably, this would be imposing a specific culture, religion or view 
on others who may reasonably disagree – and, moreover, disagree on the basis of credible, 
empirical data. Hence, confronted by the evidence of 2020, the majority’s reasoning in its 
current form can no longer be seen to be an acceptable ‘public reason’. Hence, the majority 
would have to find the no-double-donor requirement contained in section 294 fails to serve a 
legitimate government purpose. 
If the majority should seek to retain section 294, it would need to rely on another 
suitable ‘public reason’, for instance, as the minority did in AB, who concluded that section 
294 was enacted for purpose of preventing the circumvention of the adoption process.357 
However, it is doubtful that such a purpose justifies the limitation. As the minority held: 
‘[A]s there is no comparable alternative to double-donor surrogacy for those who cannot 
provide a gamete in order to have a child, the limitation of rights in the present case is far-
reaching. As already shown, double-donor surrogacy and adoption are not sufficiently similar 
processes. […] Ultimately, the quintessential question that lies at the heart of this matter is 
whether section 294, as it stands, serves a purpose which is so fundamental as to outweigh and 
justify the corresponding limitations of the rights in question.’358 
 
On finding that section 294 ‘unreasonably and unjustifiably infringes the rights to 
psychological integrity and equality’ of individuals who are pregnancy and conception 
infertile, the minority held this section is inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.359 
Therefore, this reason was convincingly rejected.  
However, this is not the end of the enquiry: ‘The question that remains is whether this 
Court should suspend the declaration of invalidity in terms of section 172(1)(b) of the 
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Constitution, as suggested by the Minister, in order for the Legislature to be given an 
opportunity to correct the defect.’360 While the Court is not required to suspend the declaration 
of invalidity, it may in situations where it is found to be just and equitable to do so.361 To this 
end, the SAG maintained that the only appropriate remedy was to strike down section 294 
without a suspension of invalidity.362 On considering that the striking down of section 294 
would ‘upset the scheme of Chapter 19’,363 the minority held that it would be ‘inappropriate to 
deprive the Legislature of the opportunity to reformulate section 294’.364 
Considering the long journey of ‘AB’ to have a child, is it really necessary for the Court 
to insist on a suspension of invalidity? The next section considers the implications. 
 
III  IMPLICATIONS  
The aim of this section is to assess whether striking down section 294 adequately preserves the 
child’s best interests, while maintaining the rights of infertile individuals to access double-
donor surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction. Can this purpose be achieved through 
simply ‘deleting’ section 294 from chapter 19 of the Children’s Act, or are there other issues 
that the Legislature would do well to consider in order to guarantee the best possible outcome 
for surrogate children?  
 
(a) The child’s best interests and the question of ‘blood-tie’ beliefs 
This is a worthwhile evaluation, especially with regards to one issue which begs further 
investigation – the potential risk to anonymous double-donor surrogate children who are raised 
in traditional ‘blood-tie’ communities. It must be recognised that even if the Court declares 
section 294 unconstitutional, this does not mean that the cultural values presumed by the 
majority will suddenly vanish. Although these ‘comprehensive doctrines’ may not justify 
limiting the reproductive rights of others, rights to religious and cultural freedoms are still 
protected in the Constitution.365 It is, therefore, accepted that there will be law-makers and 
judges – as well as many ordinary South Africans – who will most likely continue to disapprove 
of anonymous double-donor surrogacy for personal, religious or cultural reasons. Since these 
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beliefs are sure to persist in our society, it is conceivable that the removal of section 294 may 
pose a danger to children’s well-being in certain contexts. After all, a child who grows up in a 
community which fiercely holds to traditional ‘blood ties’ may indeed suffer identity loss and 
feel spiritually disconnected if the child is inculcated with this cultural belief. It is clear that 
within South Africa, two distinct realities exist – one where anonymous double-donor-
conceived surrogate children may flourish; another where they may experience censure. Should 
law-makers, the Court and even the broader community permit such a risk to children’s 
psychological well-being? 
 In answering this question, I rely on some persuasive arguments levelled by Thaldar in 
his critique of AB. Thaldar examined the likelihood that such a situation may occur. He 
concluded that ‘common-sense probabilities’ suggest that individuals who hold strongly to 
‘blood-tie’ beliefs are extremely unlikely to resort to anonymous double-donor surrogacy in 
order to have a child.366 Hence, it is highly improbable that anonymous double-donor-
conceived children will be brought up in communities who subscribe to these cultural precepts. 
Thaldar continued that even if there was a small chance that a few individuals who live within 
these communities may make use of anonymous double-donor gametes; nevertheless, it would 
be excessive and disproportionate to prohibit all commissioning parents from utilising this 
reproductive option. Instead, he proposed that the court could continue to evaluate the best 
interests of a child on a case by case basis, and include in its enquiry the prospective child’s 
social environment. This approach will result in an individualised enquiry into the particular 
prospective child’s best interests, which better aligns with Constitutional Court precedent and 
the Constitution’s proportionality principle.367  
At first blush, this solution could suggest that section 294 may simply be deleted, since 
children’s rights are upheld by the best interests standard already in operation. Nevertheless, 
while the inclusion of the prospective child’s cultural environment into ‘the best interests’ 
enquiry appears to be a straight-forward solution, the implications pose genuine constitutional 
issues.  
If one accepts Meyerson’s argument, that the bionormative conception of family 
unfairly stigmatises non-genetic families,368 one must consider whether the potential for social 
stigmatisation should inform the Court’s enquiry into the child’s best interests at all. Could the 
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court deny prospective parents the use of anonymous double-donor gametes, simply because 
the resultant child might be stigmatised in traditional communities?  
To this end, Thaldar opined that the ‘law should not give effect to prejudice’.369 He 
argued that this principle was affirmed in Hoffman v South African Airways,370 albeit in a case 
concerning employment discrimination against persons with HIV. Here, the Constitutional 
Court held: 
‘The constitutional right of the appellant not to be unfairly discriminated against cannot be 
determined by ill-informed public perception of persons with HIV. […] Prejudice can never 
justify discrimination. […] Indeed, if as a nation we are to achieve the goal of equality that we 
have fashioned in our Constitution we must never tolerate prejudice, either directly or 
indirectly.’371 
  
This principle can equally be applied to whether the court should consider the risk of 
stigmatisation as a result of anonymous double-donor conception – or even the risk that the 
child may suffer psychological harm brought on by the inculcated belief that he or she is 
lacking a foundational element of his or her identity. In assessing the child’s best interests, it 
is worth noting that the Constitution explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of ‘social 
origins’, which includes clan and family membership.372 So, while it may not be within the 
law’s power to control the prejudicial attitudes held towards those with a more murky ancestry; 
nevertheless, the State must not tolerate nor give effect to prejudice against persons for such 
reasons.373 Thaldar contended that the tradition-based argument relies on and bolsters cultural 
values that are discriminatory in nature, hence violating our Constitution’s commitment to 
equality.374 Therefore, in order to align with constitutional values, cultural prejudices should 
not inform ‘the child’s best interests’ enquiry.  
If this argument is accepted, then it would appear that section 294 could be struck down 
without the need for the Court to account specifically for situations of social stigmatization 
before confirming a surrogate motherhood agreement.375 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Legislature should be denied the opportunity 
to reform section 294. Having said this, I do not agree with the Minister who asserted that the 
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Legislature be given time to reconsider IVF regulations,376 which allow for double-donor 
gametes to be utilised. She argued that the Legislature be given the opportunity to remedy the 
discrepancy between regulations pertaining to surrogacy agreements and IVF, by amending 
IVF regulations to prevent the use of double-donor gametes. Considering it has been 
established that the genetic link is not important to a child’s psychological well-being, it would 
be unreasonable to limit established rights in IVF regulations, for the sake of ‘equality’. As is 
stated by the minority, such an assertion is ‘misplaced’377 – it is clear that the surrogacy 
regulations are unconstitutional, regardless of IVF regulations, not because of them. 378 
However, it must be recognised that the drafters of chapter 19 of the Children’s Act did 
not envisage the use of double-donor gametes in situations of surrogacy; therefore, there are 
no specific regulations which account for this possibility. The purpose of including chapter 19 
in the Children’s Act is to provide much-needed clarity regarding surrogate motherhood 
agreements and, in doing so, adequately protect the rights of all parties to the agreement – not 
least of all the prospective children. The removal of section 294, without special consideration 
of how best to regulate double-donor surrogacy, may prove to muddy the water and result in 
rather undesirable outcomes. 
 
(b) The effect of removing section 294 
Section 294, for all its failings, did provide the means of regulating both who must and who 
may contribute gametes to the conception of the prospective child. While it has been 
established that the genetic link is not ‘the all-important requirement’ for a child’s well-being 
as previously thought, nevertheless, if the situation of double-donor gametes is not carefully 
regulated, it may result in uncertain and undesirable outcomes – which conceivably could 
impact the resultant child negatively.  
The extant no-double-donor requirement of section 294 specifies that the prospective 
child must be conceived via the gametes of both, or at least one of the commissioning parents; 
and if the commissioning parent is single, that parent. Only where proved necessary, a gamete 
from a donor may be used – either from a known donor, such as the surrogate mother who 
contributes her egg; or an anonymous donor, such as sperm donor selected from a sperm bank.  
The presence or absence of a genetic link between the surrogate mother and the 
resultant child has important implications for the parental rights of the parties to the surrogate 
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motherhood agreement. For instance, in the case of ‘traditional’ surrogacy – where the 
surrogate mother is the genetic mother –  section 298(1) of the Children’s Act provides that the 
surrogate mother may ‘at any time prior to the lapse of a period of sixty days after the birth of 
the child terminate the surrogate motherhood agreement by filing written notice with the court.’ 
As a result of such an action, according to section 299,379 the parental rights are vested with 
the surrogate mother, and her husband or partner if any, or if none, the commissioning father. 
Furthermore, this section provides that if the termination of the surrogate motherhood 
agreement happens after the birth of the child, any parental rights which the commissioning 
parents may have had in terms of section 297 are terminated.380  
Notably, a surrogate mother who is not the genetic mother – such as in the case of full 
surrogacy – does not have the right to cancel the agreement and obtain parental rights and 
responsibilities over the surrogate child. Hence, the surrogate mother’s rights to acquire 
parental rights is based primarily on her genetic, and not just her gestational, link to the child. 
This is clearly set out in chapter 19 of the Children’s Act. Hence, prospective parents and 
surrogate mothers who wish to enter into traditional surrogacy agreements are cognisant of the 
implications and its potential impact on their parental rights.  The removal of section 294, 
however, allows for other possibilities which chapter 19 does not regulate; I examine but one.  
It is possible, for instance, that by allowing double-donors, the surrogate mother may 
supply her egg (and, therefore, is the genetic mother), while her husband may supply the sperm 
(thereby, making him the genetic father). A situation such as this – where there is a ‘surrogate 
couple’ – needs to be carefully considered and raises a number of complex legal questions. 
Since this would be the ‘natural child’ of the surrogate mother and her husband – and not of 
the prospective parents – is this situation not tantamount to ‘commissioned adoption’? Would 
ordinary adoption not be necessary? If not, could the parental rights be challenged by the 
genetic father, and should he equally be entitled to cancel the surrogate motherhood agreement 
and obtain parental rights over the child? Current legislation goes some way to answer these 
questions, but its application does not satisfactorily protect the rights of all parties.  
In cases where the parties to the surrogate agreement consider the biological father’s 
contribution to be merely that of a ‘sperm donor’, section 17 of the Regulations Relating to 
Artificial Fertilisation of Persons381 applies. This section clearly provides that in the case of 
gamete donation, once artificial fertilisation has occurred, the ownership of the gamete vests 
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with the recipient – and not with the donor.382 Consequently, it could be argued that the 
surrogate’s husband, whose intention is to act merely as a gamete donor, will possess no rights 
in respect of the resultant child, nor will he have the right to cancel the surrogate motherhood 
agreement and acquire parental rights. This highlights a bigger problem in the Regulations, as 
it fails to adequately differentiate between a known donor in general, and a known donor who 
is the husband of the woman receiving the artificial reproductive treatment. If one considers 
that the surrogate mother’s intention to donate her egg does not undermine her rights to later 
cancel the surrogate motherhood agreement, would it not, similarly, be appropriate for a known 
biological father to be given equal opportunity to cancel the surrogate motherhood agreement 
should he desire to take up parental rights concerning his genetic child? Perhaps a 
‘commissioned adoption’ is a more appropriate legal route. If applied, how would this system 
differ? 
In the case of ‘commissioned adoption’, presumably the commissioning parents would 
apply to court for an order declaring their intention to adopt the prospective child before the 
intended pregnancy. In this way, they could cover the reasonable expenses of the gestational 
mother, without these payments being viewed as ‘compensation’ for the child – which is 
strictly prohibited in the Children’s Act.383 The prospective parent(s) could then undertake 
ordinary adoption processes after the birth of the child in order to acquire parental rights. In 
terms of section 233 of the Children’s Act, a child may only be adopted if consent is given by 
each of the child’s parents;384 therefore, the biological father’s consent, in this scenario, would 
most certainly be required.  
Hence, while the biological mother’s parental rights are protected in both surrogacy 
and adoption, two vastly different scenarios exist for the rights of the biological father. In 
double-donor surrogacy, as the ‘sperm donor’, he relinquishes any claim to the child from the 
moment of conception; in ‘commissioned adoption’, he enjoys full parental rights until he 
chooses to relinquish them.  
It may be tempting to conclude that ‘commissioned adoption’ would be the better way 
forward in cases of a known sperm donor; however, in terms of the child’s rights, the surrogacy 
framework may offer greater protections for the prospective child in general. Since surrogate 
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motherhood agreements are concluded before the conception of the child, many issues are 
ironed out before this point. This ensures, for instance, that an assessment is carried out 
regarding the environment in which the child will be raised – ensuring it is a stable home – and 
that there is provision made for the surrogate child in the event of the death, divorce or 
separation of the commissioning parent(s).385 Consequently, this lessens the chance of a 
surrogate child being abandoned after birth as the necessary checks into the prospective 
parents’ suitability to parent is concluded before the child is even conceived. In the case of 
adoption, while similar provisions are made for ensuring the well-being of the child, these do 
not occur as a prerequisite for the conception of a specific ‘commissioned’ child.  Furthermore, 
the adoption process only begins after the birth of the child, in which case if the prospective 
parents die or divorce before the adoption goes through, the child may be in an extremely 
vulnerable situation, left with biological parents who did not intend to raise her and prospective 
parents who no longer are able or may not wish to take on parental responsibilities. 
There are further considerations which also make ‘surrogacy’ a far better framework. 
The surrogate mother is assessed for her suitability to be a surrogate386 – this safeguard is 
clearly lacking in ‘commissioned adoption’, where no such criteria exist for the selection of a 
‘suitable mother’. Furthermore, in adoption, there is no requirement that the conception of the 
child must be artificial – in other words, the child in these arrangements could be naturally 
conceived.387 Natural conception offers the distinct advantage of saving on the exorbitant costs 
of ARTs, which would make natural-conception ‘commissioned adoption’ more accessible. 
However, the requirement for artificial conception in surrogacy is useful in that it also ensures 
that provisions for the appropriate genetic testing of donor gametes is applied,388  which in turn 
lowers the risk of the resultant child being born with a genetic condition. Again, no such 
requirement in cases of adoption exist.  
The reason for these gaping holes in adoption regulations is, of course, obvious. 
Adoption is, after all, a solution applied in situations where a child – already conceived or born 
– cannot be cared for adequately by his or her biological family.389 The adoption regulations 
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were not intended to apply to cases of ‘commissioned adoption’, where a couple willingly has 
a child for another.  
It is, therefore, evident that since double-donor surrogacy was not originally 
contemplated by the Legislature, the current laws are clearly inadequate to appropriately 
regulate the situation of a ‘surrogate couple’ or ‘commissioned adoption’. Therefore, section 
294 could not be struck out without allowing the Legislature time to remedy the provision. As 
has been illustrated with this example, although current legislation can be applied to cases of 
double-donor surrogacy, its application is inadequate to safeguard the interests of all parties in 
situations of partial surrogacy with a known gamete donor. This lack of appropriate legislation, 
most importantly, compromises the best interests of children. 
 
(c) Recommendations for amending section 294 
The Legislature may, after investigation, choose to regulate double-donor surrogacy in a 
manner that prevents certain undesirable possibilities or develop the law in ways that 
effectively safeguard the interests of all parties by providing clear regulations better suited to 
the unique situation of double-donor surrogacy. In fact, even the use of an unknown donor’s 
sperm in cases of partial surrogacy may require some careful consideration.  
In light of this, I suggest that the Legislature in permitting double-donor surrogacy 
should do so only in cases of full surrogacy, as this will avoid a situation where the surrogate 
mother (and, perhaps, her husband) may have equal, if not arguably stronger, claims to the 
resultant child as the commissioning parents. Insisting on full surrogacy in cases where double-
donor gametes are utilised avoids a number of complex issues that have a high potential for 
conflict – which is not in the child’s interests. The full-surrogacy requirement for double-donor 
surrogacy is a solution that still allows those who are pregnancy and conception infertile to 
access surrogacy as a means to have a child, without compromising any party’s rights. This, I 
suggest, is the most sensible approach and one which has been adopted by other countries. 
Greece, for instance, only permits full surrogacy, but does not specify whose egg must be used 
for the purpose of conception in surrogacy agreements; therefore, double-donor surrogacy is 
permitted so long as the egg is not the surrogate mother’s.390  
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Undeniably, the regulation of double-donor surrogacy is a policy decision that should 
be left to the Legislature. Therefore, the Court will be correct to suspend the declaration of 
invalidity, allowing the Legislature time to remedy section 294, as striking down the impugned 
provision would certainly ‘require the Court to engage in the details of law-making’.391   
 
IV  CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have sought to finally answer the hypothetical question: ‘In light of present-
day research, would AB have been decided differently?’ After confirming the credibility of the 
latest research findings, I concluded that the court would have had no choice but to declare 
section 294 unconstitutional; the no-double-donor requirement simply fails to fulfil any 
legitimate government purpose. Nevertheless, since double-donor surrogacy was not initially 
contemplated by the Legislature, the existing regulations are not adequate to provide the 
necessary clarity nor the safeguards to protect the interests of all parties. These decisions are 
undeniably policy choices, which must be left to the Legislature. While this was a hypothetical 
scenario, the Minister of Social Development would do well to read ‘the writing on the wall’. 
Section 294 has been weighed, measured, and found wanting – I implore the Legislature to 
reform the impugned provision by permitting double-donor surrogacy, which will better reflect 
our constitutional values. This will require the careful crafting of regulations which keenly 









The case of AB v Minister of Social Development would have been decided differently in 2020. 
Influential studies around new family forms persuasively show that despite lacking a biological 
and gestational link to their parents, donor-conceived surrogate children exhibit high self-
esteem, are generally well-adjusted and enjoy strong family relationships. The evidence 
convincingly challenges the strongly held suppositions of the majority – and, in light of a dearth 
of evidence in defence of the importance of ‘blood ties’ and genetic relatedness in families, 
these beliefs are doubtlessly defeated. However, simply striking down the impugned provision 
will not adequately protect the interests of all parties. While the Legislature must bring section 
294 in line with constitutional principles based on empirical evidence – rather than falling back 
on unfounded fears – section 294, however, requires a deliberate reworking which ensures the 
effective safeguarding of all interests, and most especially that of children’s. One suggestion is 
to permit double-donor surrogacy only in cases of full surrogacy. This study clearly exposes 
that the no-double-donor requirement of section 294 fails to fulfil a legitimate government 
purpose; instead it works to choke out the constitutional rights of conception and pregnancy 
infertile individuals under the semblance of safeguarding ‘the best interests of the child’. 
Grounding legislation in beliefs which clearly exhibit a discriminatory attitude is untenable in 
our constitutional democracy. The preamble of the Constitution provides that South Africa 
belongs to all who live in it – and, therefore, are all equally deserving of dignity and respect. It 
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